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INTRODUCTION 
Few doctrines of constitutional criminal procedure generate as 
much controversy as the Fourth Amendment1 exclusionary rule.2 Be­
yond the basic mandate of the rule - that evidence obtained in viola­
tion of an individual's right to be secure against unreasonable search 
and seizure is inadmissible in a criminal proceeding - little else is 
agreed upon.3 The precise date of the exclusionary rule's inception is 
* Many thanks to Professor Yale Kamisar for invaluable guidance and commentary. 
1. U.S. CONST. amend. IV states: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against un­
reasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
2. See WAYNER. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT § 1.2, at 24 (3d ed. 1996) ("For well over half a century now, the validity and 
efficacy of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule have been vigorously debated by legal 
commentators."); see also id. at n.1 for a sampling of the vast body of literature debating the 
merits of the exclusionary rule. 
3. The exclusionary rule is not limited to the Fourth Amendment; it is implicated also by 
violations of the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and the Sixth Amend-
238 
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uncertain, but it has been applied by the judiciary for over eight dec­
ades.4 While the Supreme Court has emphasized that the rule is a "ju­
dicially created remedy," and not a "personal constitutional right,"5 
this characterization provokes argument as to the doctrine's suscepti­
bility to statutory or judicial attrition.6 Indeed, essentially the only 
element of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule that generates 
consensus is that the contours of this fundamental doctrine remain ill­
defined.7 
The exclusionary rule applies not only to evidence seized as a "di­
rect'' or "primary" result of an illegal search, but also to "derivative" 
or "secondary" evidence obtained from unlawful police action.8 For 
instance, a gun seized during a warrantless search of a residence would 
ment right to counsel. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (Fifth Amendment); Massiah 
v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964) ( Sixth Amendment). 
4. See Potter Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, Develop­
ment and Future of the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure Cases, 83 CO LUM. L. REV. 
1365, 1372 (1983) ("None of the three Supreme Court cases credited with producing the rule 
[(Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585 (1904), 
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914))] focused on whether the exclusionary rule, as 
we know it, should exist - yet somehow, in 1914, after all three cases had been decided, the 
rule was established."). 
5. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984) (stating that the exclusionary rule 
"operates as a 'judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights 
generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the party 
aggrieved.'") (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974)). 
6. See LAFAVE, supra note 2, § 1.l(f), at 22 (noting the presence of "an intense debate as 
to the precise constitutional status of the exclusionary rule and, in particular, whether Con­
gress could place significant limitations upon the rule or even abolish it entirely .... "); Yale 
Kamisar, Does (Did)(Should) The Exclusionary Rule Rest On A "Principled Basis" Rather 
Than An "Empirical Proposition"?, 16 CREIGHTON L.R. 565, 624 (1983) [hereinafter 
Kamisar, Exclusionary Rule] (arguing that the Court's decision in Mapp v. Ohio established 
that "the exclusionary rule is not a 'mere rule of evidence' or an exercise of the Court's su­
pervisory powers over federal criminal justice, but a command of the Constitution.") (citing 
Mapp v. Ohio 367 U.S. 643, 646-50 (1961)). 
7. See LAFAVE, supra note 2, § 1.1, at 3 ("It is primarily because of the exclusionary rule 
that courts are called upon to meet the seemingly unceasing challeni"le of marking the dimen­
sions of the protections flowing from the Fourth Amendment."). 
The history of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule was not always marked by con­
tention. A half century ago, in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), the Court held that the 
exclusionary rule, applied for years at the federal level, see Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 
383 (1914), need not be enforced in state. Only twelve years later, the Court, in Mapp v. 
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), overruled Wolf, holding that the Due Process Clause of the Four­
teenth Amendment made the Fourth Amendment 's guarantees against unreasonable search 
and seizure applicable to the states. Although Mapp featured a vigorous dissent by Justice 
Harlan, he did not malign the validity of the exclusionary rule, but rather questioned the 
wisdom of superseding contrary practice in the individual states' administration of their re­
spective criminal laws. But the criticism was so harsh that general acceptance of the exclu­
sionary rule eroded, and the tactics of the opposition shifted to an assault on the doctrine 
itself. See Kamisar, Exclusionary Rule, supra note 6, at 565-66. 
8. Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 804 (1984) ("[T]he exclusionary rule reaches 
not only primary evidence obtained as a direct result of an illegal search or seizure, but also 
evidence later discovered to be derivative of an illegality or 'fruit of the poisonous tree.' " 
(internal citations omitted)). 
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be subject to suppression under the exclusionary rule. But if the gun 
was seized on the basis of information learned from an illegal search, 
the court must ask whether the challenged evidence was "tainted" by 
the initial Fourth Amendment violation, and thus the "fruit of the poi­
sonous tree. "9 
Much of the confusion surrounding the exclusionary rule results 
from the Supreme Court's historical development of multiple excep­
tions to the rule generally, and to the fruit of the poisonous tree doc­
trine specifically.10 The Court has recognized three exceptions to the 
fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine: the "independent source," "at­
tenuation," and "inevitable discovery" exceptions.11 The first was an­
nounced in the 1920 decision Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United 
States,12 where the Court held that the exclusionary rule forbids the in­
troduction of not only illegally obtained evidence, but also any addi­
tional incriminating evidence derived from the primary evidence.13 The 
Court limited its decision, however, stating that if law enforcement ac­
quired the derivative evidence from an "independent source," those 
facts thus obtained did not become "sacred and inaccessible."14 The 
second exception came two decades later in Nardone v. United States,15 
where the Court established that even if unlawfully obtained evidence 
9. Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939). In the context of the phrase, "fruit 
of the poisonous tree," the unlawful search and seizure is the poisonous tree; the illegally 
obtained evidence is the fruit. Despite the widespread use of the term, courts occasionally 
confuse the distinction and misapply the doctrine. See, e.g., United States v. Pimentel, 810 
F.2d 366, 368 n.1 (2d Cir. 1987) (correcting the district court's description of the evidence as 
the poisonous tree). 
See also LAFAVE, supra note 2, § 11.4, at 230-32. Professor LaFave has describ('d addi-
tional examples of challenged evidence that is derivative in nature: 
An illegal arrest may result in the arrestee giving a confession or in his being identified by 
the victim of or a witness to a crime; an illegal search may result in the police obtaining a 
confession or a witness who is now prepared to testify against the defendant, or may uncover 
facts which lead to an arrest or to another search on some occasion. 
Id. at 232. 
Finally, as with the exclusionary rule itself, see supra note 3, the "fruit of the poisonous 
tree" doctrine extends beyond the Fourth Amendment and applies also to violations of the 
Fifth and Sixth Amendments. Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n of N.Y. Harbor, 378 U.S. 52 
(1964) (Fifth Amendment); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (Sixth Amendment). 
10. See, e.g., Carmen R. Parcelli, Twenty-Ninth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: 
The Exclusionary Rule, 88 GEO. L.J. 799, 1043-56 (2000) (surveying the many exceptions to 
the exclusionary rule). 
11. E.g., United States v. Ramirez-Sandoval, 872 F.2d 1392, 1396 (9th Cir. 1989). 
12. 251 U.S. 385 (1920). 
13. The Silverthorne opinion was authored by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, and his 
eloquent words are oft-repeated: "The essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of 
evidence in a certain way is that not merely evidence so acquired shall not be used before the 
Court but that it shall not be used at all." Id. at 392. 
14. Id. 
15. 308 U.S. 338 (1939). 
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did not come from an independent source, it may still be admissible if 
the state proved that the causal connection between the challenged 
evidence and the officer's illegal actions had "become so attenuated as 
to dissipate the taint."16 If the prosecution failed to prove adequate 
dissipation, noted Justice Frankfurter, the evidence was suppressed as 
the "fruit of the poisonous tree."17 In 1963, the Court further refined 
the independent source and attenuation doctrines in Wong Sun v. 
United States.18 On this occasion, although reaffirming the fruit of the 
poisonous tree doctrine, the Court again qualified the scope of the rule 
by permitting inquiry into whether derivative evidence was discovered 
by exploiting the prior unlawful police activity, or rather by "means 
sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint."19 Thus, 
the Court's treatment of the exclusionary rule has been both sporadic 
and imprecise, repeatedly recognizing the validity of the rule while si­
multaneously emphasizing that it is not without exception.20 
Continuing this trend, in 1984 the Supreme Court in Nix v. 
Williams21 recognized a third exception to the fruit of the poisonous 
tree doctrine - the inevitable discovery exception.22 As the name im-
16. Id. at 341. 
17. Id. 
18. 371 U.S. 471 (1963). 
19. Id. at 488 (quoting J. MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE OF GUILT 211 (1959)). 
20. See LAFAVE, supra note 2, § 11.4(a), at 235 ("In neither Nardone nor Wong Sun did 
the Court elaborate upon the 'attenuated connection' test, thus leaving it rather uncertain 
exactly what it was that lower courts were expected to look for, to say nothing of what facts 
would be relevant to an 'attenuation' determination."). Cf Stewart, supra note 4, at 1366: 
Looking back, the exclusionary rule seems a bit jerry-built - like a roller coaster track con­
structed while the roller coaster sped along. Each new piece of track was attached hastily and 
imperfectly to the one before it, just in time to prevent the roller coaster from crashing, but 
without the opportunity to measure the curves and dips preceding it or to contemplate the 
twists and turns that lay ahead. 
21. 467 U.S. 431 (1984). 
22. The inevitable discovery exception did not originate from the U.S. Supreme Court. 
Rather, the Nix Court noted that, in 1984, "the 'vast majority' of all courts, both state and 
federal, recognize an inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule." 467 U.S. at 
440. 
In fact, the inevitable discovery exception appears to have first been applied in 1943 by 
Judge Learned Hand. See The Supreme Court, Leading Cases of the 1983 Term, 98 HARV. L. 
REV. 87, 123 (1984) [hereinafter Leading Cases of the 1983 Term]. In Somers v. United States, 
138 F.2d 790 (2d Cir. 1943), investigators from the "Alcohol Tax Unit" unlawfully entered 
and searched the home of the defendant, in which they found an illegal still in operation. Id. 
at 791. Somers was not home at the time, but his wife told the investigators he would be re­
turning soon. Id. The agents waited outside, and when Somers arrived twenty ininutes later, 
they proceeded legally to search his car, and found alcohol in the trunk. Id. The district court 
suppressed all evidence from the illegal search of the apartment, but denied a motion to sup­
press the evidence seized from the search of the car. Id. The Second Circuit, relying on 
Silverthorne Lumber, see supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text, reversed the lower 
court's order to adinit the jugs of alcohol found in Somers's car because that subsequent 
search was based in part upon information unlawfully obtained from the search of the home. 
Id. Judge Hand remanded the case, however, as: 
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plies, when the challenged evidence would ultimately have been found 
absent the constitutional violation, the evidence will be admitted.23 
Like its predecessors, however, the Nix Court unfortunately failed to 
establish with sufficient clarity the parameters of when to apply the in­
evitable discovery exception.24 Most importantly, the Court neglected 
to define adequately when a discovery is truly inevitable.25 
The inevitable discovery exception bears a "functional similarity" 
to its ancestor the independent source doctrine, 26 under which evi­
dence is admissible if it was discovered by means entirely separate 
from the police misconduct.27 The inevitable discovery exception is 
more difficult to administer, however, because courts must determine 
whether the hypothetical independent investigation would, in fact, 
have led to the discovery of the challenged evidence.28 Indeed, the Nix 
[I]t does not follow that that the seizure was inevitably invalid. Possibly, further inquiry will 
show that, quite independently of what Somers ' wife told them, the officers would have gone 
to the street, have waited for Somers and have arrested him, exactly as they did. If they can 
satisfy the court of this, so that it appears that they did not need the information, the seizure 
may have been lawful . 
Id. at 792. 
2 3 . See Nix, 467 U.S. at 448 ("[W)hen, as here, the evidence in question would inevitably 
have been discovered without reference to the police error or misconduct, there is no nexus 
sufficient to provide a taint, and the evidence is admissible. "). 
2 4. United States v. Cherry, 7 59 F. 2d 119 6, 120 4  ( 5th Cir. 1985) ("Although the Supreme 
Court in Nix v. Williams adopted the inevitable discovery exception to hold certain evidence 
admissible, no attempt was made in that case to define the contours of that exception. "); 
United States v. Satterfield, 743 F.2d 827, 845 -46 (11th Cir. 1984) ( "The [Nix] Court stated 
without much elaboration that if the information 'ultimately or inevitably would have been 
discovered by lawful means' the exclusionary rule should not be applied. "). 
Commentators have been no less critical. See Leading Cases of the 1983 Term, supra note 
22, at 12 3 ("the [Nix] Court produced an imprecise formulation of the exception that fails to 
address even the most basic problems raised by its application . . .. "); William M. Cohn, 
Note, Sixth Amendment - Inevitable Discovery: A Valuable But Easily Abused Exception to 
the Exclusionary Rule, 7 5 .  J. CRIM . L. & CRIM INOLOGY 729, 730 (1984) ("The casual treat­
ment that the Court afforded to inevitable discovery in [Nix] raises important questions 
about the doctrine's practical application . . . .  "); R. Bradley Lamberth, Note, The Inevitable 
Discovery Doctrine: Procedural Safeguards to Inevitability, 40 BAYLOR L. REV. 1 29, 1 3 6  
(1988) ("In its articulation o f  the inevitable discovery exception, the Court left unanswered 
many questions as to when discovery is inevitable . ... "). 
2 5. See Cherry, 7 59 F.2d at 1204 ("The Supreme Court especially provided no guidance 
as to what, beyond the specific facts of Williams itself, constitutes an 'inevitable' discovery. "); 
Satterfield, 743 F.2d at 846 ("Except for the application of its rule to the specific facts before 
the Court . . .  the Supreme Court was silent as to what constitutes an 'inevitable discovery' 
under the doctrine. "). 
2 6. Nix, 467 U. S. at 444; see also Murray v. United States, 487 U. S. 533, 539 (1988) ("The 
inevitable discovery exception, with its distinct requirements, is in reality an extrapolation 
from the independent source exception: Since the tainted evidence would be admissible if in 
fact discovered through an independent source, it should be admissible if it inevitably would 
have been discovered. "). 
27. See Nix, 467 U. S. at 443. 
2 8. See id., 467 U.S. at 459 (Brennan, J., dissenting ) ("The inevitable discovery exception 
necessarily implicates a hypothetical finding that differs in kind from the factual finding that 
precedes application of the independent source rule."); see also United States v. Herrold, 9 6 2  
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Court, cognizant of the necessity that a defined conception of inevita­
bility be enforced, maintained that "inevitable discovery involves no 
speculative elements but focuses on demonstrated historical facts ca­
pable of ready verification or impeachment . . . .  "29 Lower courts have 
pointed out that this statement is partially inaccurate, as some specula­
tion is required to determine whether the evidence in question would 
have been discovered but for the police illegality.3° Courts therefore 
look to "demonstrated historical facts"31 that establish a causal connec­
tion between the lawful investigation and unlawful discovery, to mini­
mize the amount of necessary speculation.32 
Prominent among the uncertain directives in Nix is whether law 
enforcement officials are required to have been actively pursuing an 
alternate line of investigation at the time of the constitutional miscon­
duct. In other words, at the time one officer is engaged in a search 
violative of the Fourth Amendment, must another officer have already 
set in motion an independent and lawful inquiry that would have led 
to the discovery of the same evidence? The majority in Nix did not ex­
plicitly address the "active pursuit" doctrine, but the concurring and 
dissenting opinions characterized the decision as requiring such,33 and 
F.2d 11 31, 11 40 (3d Cir. 1992 ) ("[U]nder the independent source doctrine, evidence that was 
in fact discovered lawfully, and not as a direct or indirect result of illegal activity, is admissi­
ble. In contrast, the inevitable discovery doctrine, applied in Nix, permits the introduction of 
evidence that inevitably would have been discovered through lawful means, although the 
search that actually led to the discovery of the evidence was unlawful. The independent 
source and inevitable discovery doctrines thus differ in that the former focuses on what actu­
ally happened and the latter considers what would have happened in the absence of the ini­
tial search. "); Robert M. Bloom, Inevitable Discovery: An Exception Beyond the Fruits, 20 
AM. J. CRIM. L. 79, 81 (1992 )  ("[U]nlike the independent source doctrine in which the alter­
native source actually leads to the evidence in question, the inevitable discovery exception is 
speculative, since the independent investigation only hypothetically, not actually, leads to the 
evidence."). 
2 9. Nix, 467 U. S. at 445 n. 5. 
30. E.g., United States v. Leake, 9 5  F. 3d 409, 412 ( 6th Cir. 199 6 )  (" By its nature, the in­
evitable discovery doctrine requires some degree of speculation as to what the government 
would have discovered absent the illegal conduct. "); United States v. Eng, 971 F. 2d 85 4, 861, 
(2d Cir. 1992 ) ("[B]y its nature inevitable discovery analysis inevitably involves some degree 
of speculation. "). 
31. Courts have indicated that any of a number of elements may serve as a "demon­
strated historical fact. " See, e.g. , Eng, 971 F.2d at 859 ("[T]he facts of cases applying the in­
evitable discovery doctrine suggest that proof of inevitability is made more convincing when 
the areas of the search or investigation are well -defined, the government effort is planned 
and methodical, and a direct causal relationship and reasonably close temporal relationship 
exist between what was known and what had occurred prior to the government misconduct 
and the allegedly inevitable discovery of the evidence. "). 
32. See Leake, 95 F. 3d at 412 (" Speculation . . .  must be kept to a minimum; courts must 
focus on 'demonstrated historical facts capable of ready verification or impeachment. ' " )  
(quoting Nix, 467 U. S. at  444- 45 n. 5); Eng, 971 F.2d at  86 1 (noting "the requirement that an 
inevitable discovery inquiry focus on 'demonstrated historical facts' so as to keep speculation 
to an absolute minimum . . . .  ") (quoting Nix, 467 U. S. at 444-45 n. 5). 
3 3. See infra Section l.B. 
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the conventional understanding of the case is that the facts did include 
a separate, constitutionally permissible investigation.34 
Some lower courts have interpreted active pursuit by law enforce­
ment of an alternate, independent line of investigation as the neces­
sary "demonstrated historical fact" required by the Nix Court35 to be 
proven by a preponderance of the evidence36 to admit the evidence 
under the inevitable discovery exception.37 Some of the federal circuits 
34. See infra Section I.A. 
35. See supra text accompanying note 29 (discussing the Nix Court's requirement that 
the prosecution present "demonstrated historical facts capable of ready verification or im­
peachment" that discovery was inevitable, in order for the exception to apply). 
36. The burden of proof standard imposed in Nix - preponderance of the evidence - is 
not without controversy. In fact, this was the stated reason for Justice Brennan's dissent: 
To ensure that this hypothetical finding [of inevitable discovery] is narrowly confined to cir­
cumstances that are functionally equivalent to an independent source, and to protect fully 
the fundamental rights served by the exclusionary rule, I would require clear and convincing 
evidence before concluding that the government had met its burden of proof on this issue. 
Nix, 467 U.S. at 459 (Brennan, J. dissenting). 
Lower courts have also questioned the standard. For example, the Second Circuit has 
noted "the difference between proving by a preponderance that something would have hap­
pened and proving by a preponderance that something would inevitably have happened." 
United States v. Cabassa, 62 F.3d 470, 474 (2d Cir. 1995). According to the Second Circuit: 
There are, of course, semantic problems in using the preponderance of the evidence standard 
to prove inevitability. To say that more probably than not event "X" would have occuffed is 
to say only that there is a 50%+ chance that "X" would have occurred. Oearly, the doctrine 
of inevitable discovery requires something more where the discovery is based upon the ex­
pected issuance of a warrant. Otherwise, it would result in illegally seized evidence being re­
ceived when there was a 49% chance that a warrant would not have issued or would not have 
issued in a timely fashion, hardly a showing of inevitability. 
Id. at 474. 
Nevertheless, preponderance of the evidence remains the applicable standard, and 
courts emphasize the care with which it must be strictly enforced. The Seventh Circuit, for 
instance, has stated that: 
Nix . . .  speaks in terms of proof by preponderance of the evidence that the government 
would have discovered the challenged evidence through lawful means; and typically that will 
entail testimony rather than mere argument. It is all too easy to imagine in retrospect lawful 
avenues through which the government might have obtained evidence that in reality it came 
upon in contravention of the Fourth Amendment. Speculation and assumption do not satisfy 
the dictates of Nix, however. Inevitable discovery is not an exception to be invoked casually, 
and if it is to be prevented from swallowing the Fourth Amendment and the exclusionary 
rule, courts must take care to hold the government to its burden of proof. 
United States v. Jones, 72 F.3d 1324, 1334 (7th Cir. 1995) (internal citations omitted). 
For additional criticism of a preponderance of the evidence standard, see Leading Cases 
of the 1983 Term, supra note 22, at 129-30; SilasWasserstrom & William J. Mertens, The Ex­
clusionary Rule on the Scaffold: But Was It A Fair Trial?, 22 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 85, 172-75 
(1984); Lamberth, supra note 24, at 144-46. 
37. E.g. , United States v. Cherry, 759 F.2d 1196, 1205 n.10 ("[T]he Supreme Court stated 
in [Nix] that the inevitable discovery exception 'involves no speculative elements but focuses 
on demonstrated historical facts.' This comment implies that the alternate means of obtain­
ing the evidence must at least be in existence and, at least to some degree, imminent, if yet 
unrealized. If the inevitable discovery exception can be applied on the basis of the police of­
ficer's mere intention to use legal means subsequently, the focus of the inquiry would hardly 
be on historical fact." (internal citation omitted)). 
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have explicitly rejected the active pursuit requirement.38 Other courts, 
by contrast, adhere to the doctrine.39 Finally, further complicating mat­
ters is the fact that some circuits that require active pursuit have indi­
cated that the doctrine may, at times, be avoided.40 The federal judici­
ary therefore applies inconsistent interpretations of whether the 
inevitable discovery exception may be invoked in the absence of an 
ongoing, independent investigation. Lower courts' divergent adoption 
of the active pursuit doctrine has resulted in an uneven application of 
38. United States v. Ford, 22 F.3d 374, 377 (1st Cir. 1994) ("declin[ing] to adopt such a 
strict approach " as the active pursuit doctrine); United States v. Thomas, 955 F.2d 207, 210 
(4th Cir. 1992) (rejecting the active pursuit doctrine as a "blanket requirement "); United 
States v. Kennedy, 61 F.3d 494, 499-500 (6th Cir. 1995) ("[A]n alternate, independent line of 
investigation is not required for the inevitable discovery exception to apply."); United States 
v. Boatwright, 822 F.2d 862, 864 (9th Cir. 1987) ("The existence of two independent investi­
gations at the time of discovery is not ... a necessary predicate to the inevitable discovery 
exception."); United States v. Larsen, 127 F.3d 984, 986 (10th Cir. 1997) ("[T]he inevitable 
discovery exception applies . .. whether or not the investigation was ongoing at the time of 
the illegal police misconduct. "). Further, it appears two additional.circuits have implicitly 
rejected the active pursuit requirement. See United States v. De Reyes, 149 F.3d 192, 195 (3d 
Cir. 1998) (citing, with approval, the inevitable discovery approaches of the Tenth and Sixth 
circuits, neither of which require active pursuit); United States v. Warren, 997 F. Supp. 1188, 
1193 (E.D. Wisc. 1998) (noting that "the Seventh Circuit's recent formulations of the test for 
inevitable discovery do not explicitly require that the government be actively pursuing a sub­
stantial alternate line of investigation at the time of the constitutional violation."). 
39. United States v. Eng, 971 F.2d 854, 861 (2d Cir. 1992) ("We agree with the Fifth Cir­
cuit's observation that: '[T]he alternate means of obtaining the evidence must at least be in 
existence and, at least to some degree, imminent, if yet unrealized.' " (quoting Cherry, 759 
F.2d at 1205 n.10)); United States v. Kirk, 111F.3d 390, 392 (5th Cir. 1997) ("In order for the 
inevitable discovery exception to apply, the Government must demonstrate ... [that it] was 
actively pursuing a 'substantial alternate line of investigation at the time of the constitutional 
violation.' " (quoting United States v. Lamas, 930 F.2d 1099, 1102 (5th Cir. 1991)); United 
States v. Williams, 181 F.3d 945, 954 (8th Cir. 1999) (stating "evidence is admissible if the 
government demonstrates . .. [that it] was actively pursuing a substantial alternative line of 
investigation at the time of the constitutional violation." (citing United States v. Conner, 127 
F.3d 663, 667 (8th Cir. 1997)); United States v. Khoury, 901 F.2d 948, 960 (11th Cir. 1990) 
("This circuit's rule is that in order to establish inevitable discovery the prosecution must 
show that the police possessed and were actively pursuing the lawful avenue of discovery 
when the illegality occurred. "). In addition, although the District of Columbia Circuit has 
never directly addressed the active pursuit doctrine, it appears to have adopted implicitly the 
requirement in affirming a district court's application of the inevitable discovery exception 
on the basis of, inter alia, an officer's testimony "that at the time he received the tainted in­
formation over the telephone [another officer] was in the process of 'searching from the top 
shelf down' the very set of shelves where the money was located. " United States v. Moy, No. 
93-3002, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 1568, at *5 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 18, 1995). 
40. See United States v. Chandler, 197 F.3d 1198, 1201 (8th Cir. 1999) ("[T)he inevitable 
discovery doctrine applies, not because the government was actively pursuing a substantial 
alternative line of investigation, which is the typical inevitable discovery situation, but be­
cause the law enforcement agency's legitimate interests as employer would have inevitably 
led it to discover contraband before Chandler, a suspended employee, could remove it from 
the workplace."); Lamas, 930 F.2d at 1104 (noting that none of the Fifth Circuit's precedent 
"disputes that a showing of active pursuit of an alternate line of investigation together with a 
showing of a reasonable probability of discovery - as is present in this case - is sufficient to 
sustain the application of the inevitable discovery exception. Whether this active pursuit 
element from Cherry is still necessary to implicate the inevitable discovery rule must await 
the case that turns on that question. "). 
246 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 99:2 38 
the inevitable discovery exception, and differing standards of justice 
for similarly situated criminal defendants.41 
Because defining the scope of the exclusionary rule implicates fun­
damental liberties - citizens' dual interests in protection from crimi­
nal behavior as well as from overzealous law enforcement42 - proper 
use of the inevitable discovery exception requires that it be applied 
with caution.43 These concerns, however, do not provide adequate jus­
tification for grafting the active pursuit doctrine onto the inevitable 
discovery exception. This Note demonstrates that the active pursuit 
doctrine is not only contrary to the Court's decision in Nix, but that it 
also fails to advance the requirement's purported goal of imposing 
proper limits upon the inevitable discovery exception. 
This Note argues that the inconsistent application of the inevitable 
discovery exception should be resolved by rejecting the narrow and 
formalistic active pursuit doctrine in favor of an "independent circum­
stances" standard that "requires that the fact or likelihood which 
makes discovery inevitable arise from circumstances other than those 
disclosed by the illegal search itself."44 Part I examines the Court's 
opinion in Nix, and demonstrates that, although active pursuit was 
both present and relevant, at no point did the majority hold that it was 
required for the inevitable discovery exception to apply. Part II ex­
plains how the active pursuit requirement operates as an inflexible per 
se rule incapable of adequately addressing the varied fact patterns that 
trigger the inevitable discovery exception. This Part also demonstrates 
that, under the independent circumstances test, inevitability legiti-
41. See Troy E. Golden, Note, The Inevitable Discovery Doctrine Today: The Demands 
of the Founh Amendment, Nix, and Murray, and the Disagreement among the Federal Cir­
cuits, 13 BYU J. PUB. L. 97, 125 (1998) ("The split in the circuits over . . .  the active pursuit 
rule creates confusion and injustice in American criminal procedure Jaw. Because the lower 
courts are divided . . .  criminal defendants receive vastly different results in very similar trials 
depending on which circuit they are prosecuted in. "); Lamberth, supra note 2 4, at 1 37- 38 
(noting that lower courts' misuse of the inevitable discovery exception has "result[ed) in a 
chaotic state of affairs that sees virtually identical factual scenarios being decided differently 
in different jurisdictions "). 
42. See, e.g., Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U. S 32 1, 32 9 (1987) (noting that when applying the 
Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule "the Constitution sometimes insulates the criminality 
of a few in order to protect the privacy of us all "); see also, e.g., Roger B. Dworkin, Fact Style 
Adjudication and the Fourth Amendment: The Limits of Lawyering, 48 IND. L.J. 329, 331 
(1973) ("Narrowly viewed, the exclusionary rule is very unattractive, because in the vast 
majority of cases in which it is applied, the immediate result is to free an obviously guilty 
person. But the guilty defendant is freed to protect the rest of us from unlawful police inva­
sions of our security and to maintain the integrity of our institutions. "). 
43. See LAFAVE, supra note 2, § ll. 4(a), at 2 44 ("In carving out the 'inevitable discov­
ery' exception to the taint doctrine, courts must use a surgeon's scalpel and not a meat 
axe. "). Cf Bloom, supra note 28, at 95 ("The exclusionary rule provides an incentive for the 
police to follow the Jaw. When exceptions to the exclusionary rule are created, the result is to 
remove the incentive.). 
44. United States v. Thomas, 955 F.2d 207, 2 11 (4th Cir. 1992); United States v. 
Boatwright, 8 2 2  F.2d 8 62, 8 6 4- 65 (9th Cir. 1987). 
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mately may be established in the absence of active pursuit. Part III ex­
amines the Fourth Amendment implications of rejecting the active 
pursuit doctrine, particularly the effects on deterring police miscon­
duct and enforcing the warrant requirement, and argues that active 
pursuit provides no additional safeguards against an unmerited appli­
cation of the inevitable discovery exception. 
I. UNDERSTANDING NIXV. WILLIAMS 
The lack of instruction provided by Nix is both unfortunate and 
surprising, especially in light of the case's extensive procedural his­
tory45 and the fact that it involved one of the most infamous and 
closely scrutinized crimes of its era.46 Because this was, after all, the 
first time that the Supreme Court officially recognized the inevitable 
discovery exception, it seems justified to expect greater guidance than 
the Court provided in its relatively cursory statement of the doctrine.47 
There are multiple ambiguities in the opinion, allowing proponents of 
the active pursuit doctrine to find support in Nix's facts. This Part ar­
gues that, while it is generally understood that there was active pursuit 
in Nix,48 this factor was not essential to the Court's holding. Section 
I.A explains the facts and history of Nix, and examines the role of ac­
tive pursuit in the decision. Section LB argues that at no point did the 
Nix majority hold active pursuit to be a necessary prerequisite to the 
application of the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary 
rule. 
A. The Decision: Active Pursuit was Relevant 
The facts in Nix were particularly compelling, and undeniably 
tragic. On Christmas Eve 1968, ten-year-old Pamela Powers and her 
parents were at the Des Moines, Iowa YMCA to watch her brother's 
wrestling tournament. Powers excused herself to use the restroom, and 
disappeared. Shortly thereafter, witnesses saw Robert Williams, an es­
caped mental patient lodging at the YMCA, exiting the building and 
45. The eventual conviction of Robert Anthony Williams for first-degree murder re­
quired fifteen years and ten court decisions, including two by the U.S. Supreme Court. See 
infra Section I.A. 
46. See, e.g., Wasserstrom & Mertens, supra note 36, at 130-31 ("The Supreme Court's 
1977 case of Brewer v. Williams (Williams I) was one of the most written about criminal pro­
cedure decisions in U.S. history. The decision, by a bare majority of five justices, reversed 
the murder conviction of [Robert) Anthony Williams, instigating wide discussion in both the 
academic literature and the popular media. This interest was hardly surprising. Before it had 
ever reached federal court, [Williams] was one of the most notorious murder cases in the his­
tory of Iowa."). 
47. See supra text accompanying notes 24-25. 
48. But see infra notes 67-68. 
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carrying a blanket that concealed a bulky object. A boy who opened 
Williams's car door for him stated that he saw the bundle had "two 
legs in it and they were skinny and white." The next day, December 
25, Williams's car was found in Davenport, Iowa, 160 miles east of Des 
Moines. Other evidence, including items of Powers's clothing and an 
army blanket resembling the one Williams had carried to his car, was 
found at a highway rest stop near Grinnell, between Des Moines and 
Davenport. The police, accordingly, initiated and directed a systematic 
effort involving two hundred volunteers to search the vicinity of the 
Grinnell rest stop.49 
On December 26, Williams surrendered to local police in 
Davenport, and was arraigned. Williams contacted an attorney in Des 
Moines, who arranged for local counsel in Davenport to meet the sus­
pect at the police station. Two Des Moines detectives were dispatched 
to Davenport to transport Williams back, and they assured his Des 
Moines attorney that Williams would not be questioned while in tran­
sit. Upon arrival in Davenport, the Des Moines detectives again as­
sured Williams's local counsel that he would not be interrogated, but 
denied the Davenport lawyer's request to accompany the group in the 
car back to Des Moines.50 Despite these assurances, on the return 
drive one of the detectives, Captain Leaming, "began a conversation" 
49. Nix, 467 U.S. at 434-36. For a more comprehensive rendering of the intricate facts in 
the Nix line of decisions, see generally Phillip E. Johnson, The Return of the "Christian Burial 
Speech" Case, 32 EMORY L.J. 349 (1983). 
50. The details of the "agreements" made between the Des Moines police and 
Williams's attorneys were disputed. The Nix majority described this series of events as fol­
lows: "Williams contacted a Des Moines attorney who arranged for an attorney in Daven­
port to meet Williams at the Davenport police station. Des Moines police informed counsel 
they would pick Williams up in Davenport and return him to Des Moines without question­
ing him." 467 U.S. at 435. 
In his concurrence, Justice Stevens further noted that: 
The [Des Moines] lawyer notified the Des Moines police of Williams' imminent surrender, 
and police officials . . .  agreed that Williams would not be questioned while being brought 
back from Davenport. Williams was advised of this agreement by his attorney. After he was 
arraigned in Davenport, Williams conferred with another lawyer who was acting as local 
counsel. This lawyer reminded Williams that he would not be questioned. When [Des 
Moines] police arrived in Davenport, local counsel stressed that the agreement was t:o be 
carried out and that Williams was not to be questioned. [The Des Moines detectives] then 
took custody of [Williams], and denied counsel's request to ride to Des Moines in the police 
car with Williams. 
Id. at 452-53 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
Because this was the second time that Williams's case was before the Supreme Court, 
inquiry into these crucial facts was not reopened. But, "[a]s Professor Kamisar has demon­
strated, there are a number of unexplained ambiguities in the record. Nevertheless, this ac­
count of the facts was the basis for Williams I, and neither party seeks reexamination of 
those findings." Id. at 453 n.2 (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing Yale Kamisar, Foreword: 
Brewer v. Williams - A Hard Look at a Discomfiting Record, 66 GEO. L.J. 209 (1977) 
[hereinafter Kamisar, Brewer v. Williams]. 
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with Williams.s1 Leaming told Williams the police knew that Powers's 
body was near Mitchellville, which they would pass en route to Des 
Moines. Later in the drive, Williams directed the officers to a spot 
near a Grinnell service station where he said he had left Powers's 
shoes, which they could not locate. He next led the police to a Grinnell 
rest area where he said he had discarded his blanket, which also was 
not found. Finally, as the car approached Mitchellville, Williams di­
rected the convoy to the girl's body in a culvert two miles south of In­
terstate 80.s2 This location was "essentially within the area to be 
searched," only two and a half miles away from where the volunteer 
searchers had earlier halted their progress when informed that 
Williams had begun to cooperate.s3 
In February 1969, Williams was tried for murder in Polk County 
Court. His motion to suppress all evidence related to the discovery of 
the body as the "fruit" of an impermissible interrogation by the police 
during the car ride from Davenport to Des Moines was denied.s4 A 
jury found Williams guilty of first-degree murder, and the Iowa Su­
preme Court affirmed his conviction.ss Williams's petition for habeas 
corpus was sustained by a federal district courts6 and upheld by the 
Eighth Circuit.s7 In a bitterly divided decision,ss the Supreme Court af­
firmed the reversal of Williams's conviction on the ground that 
Williams had been had denied his Sixth Amendment right to counsel 
51. Nix, 467 U.S. at 435. The "conversation" between Captain Dan Leaming, the chief of 
detectives and a nineteen-year veteran of the Des Moines Police Department, destined to 
later be the subject of intense scrutiny, became known as the "Christian Burial Speech." The 
gist of Learning's message to Williams, who professed to be a religious man, was as follows: 
I want to give you something to think about while we're traveling down the road . . . .  They 
are predicting several inches of snow for tonight, and I feel that you yourself are the only 
person that knows where this little girl's body is . . .  and if you get a snow on top of it you 
yourself may be unable to find it. And since we will be going right past the area [where the 
body is] on the way into Des Moines, I feel that we could stop and locate the body, that the 
parents of this little girl should be entitled to a Christian burial for the little girl who was 
snatched away from them on Christmas [E]ve and murdered . . . .  [A]fter a snow storm [we 
may not be] able to find it at all. 
Id. at 435-36. For an exhaustive examination of the Christian Burial Speech, and the circum­
stances under which it arose, see generally Kamisar, Brewer v. Williams, supra note 50. 
52. Nix, 467 U.S. at 436. Whether Williams was as willingly cooperative as depicted by 
the Nix majority has been challenged. See generally Kamisar, Brewer v. Williams, supra note 
50. 
53. Nix, 467 U.S. at 436. 
54. State v. Williams, 182 N.W.2d 396 (Iowa 1970). 
55. Id. 
56. Williams v. Brewer, 375 F. Supp. 170 (S.D. Iowa 1974). 
57. Williams v. Brewer, 509 F.2d 227 (8th Cir. 1975). 
58. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 388 (1977), featured seven opinions: Justice 
Stewart authored the 5-4 majority decision; Justices Marshall, Powell, and Stevens each filed 
concurring opinions; and Chief Justice Burger and Justices White and Blackmun filed sepa­
rate dissents. 
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at the moment of his self-incriminating statements.59 The majority, 
however, indicated in a concluding footnote that it might be possible 
to reconvict Williams. The Court stated: 
While neither Williams' incriminating statements themselves nor any tes­
timony describing his having led the police to the victim's body can con­
stitutionally be admitted into evidence, evidence of where the body was 
found and of its condition might well be admissible on the theory that the 
body would have been discovered in any event, even had incriminating 
statements not been elicited from Williams.60 
The state of Iowa followed the Supreme Court's guidance, and in 
1977, tried Williams a second time. Although his statements were not 
admitted, the trial judge permitted the prosecution to introduce evi­
dence of the condition of the body, on the ground that it would have 
been inevitably discovered, and Williams was then reconvicted by a 
jury of first-degree murder. The Iowa Supreme Court again affirmed 
Williams's conviction, holding that there exists a "hypothetical inde­
pendent source" exception to the exclusionary rule which, as applied 
here, provided that the police would ultimately have discovered the. 
body in the absence of the unlawful interrogation.61 Williams's second 
petition for writ habeas corpus was this time denied by the federal dis­
trict court,62 but the Eighth Circuit reversed on the ground that, as­
suming such an exception to the exclusionary rule existed, it was in any 
event misapplied by the Iowa Supreme Court.63 Again the United 
59. Id. at 403-06. 
60. Id. at 407 n.12. It should be noted that at the time the Supreme Court voided 
Williams's first conviction, Chief Justice Burger, in a bitter dissent, was openly hostile to the 
possibility that Williams could be successfully retried under the inevitable discovery theory 
posited by the majority, arguing that "the Court renders the prospects of doing justice in this 
case exceedingly remote." Id. at 416 n.1 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
When Williams's second conviction was upheld seven years later in Nix, it was the Chief 
Justice who wrote the opinion, a fact that Justice Stevens did not hesitate to point out: "It 
was the author of today's opinion of the Court who characterized this rule of law as a 're­
markable' and 'unlikely theory.' " Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 452 (1984) (Stevens, J., con­
c.urring) (quoting Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. at 416-17 n.1 (Burger, C.J., dissenting)). 
Id. 
61. State v. Williams, 285 N.W.2d 248, 255-62 (Iowa 1979). 
62. Williams v. Nix, 528 F. Supp. 664, 675 (S.D. Iowa 1981). 
63. Williams v. Nix, 700 F.2d 1164, 1169 (8th Cir. 1983). The Court stated: 
Our analysis of this case makes it unnecessary to decide whether to recognize the inevitable­
discovery or hypothetical-independent source exception to the rule excluding evidence ob­
tained in violation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. We assume arguendo that there 
is such an exception and that the Supreme Court of Iowa in this case correctly states the re­
quirements for establishing it. The exception as thus stated requires the State to prove two 
things: that the police did not act in bad faith, and that the evidence would have been discov­
ered in any event. We hold that the State has not met the first requirement. 
For a more detailed discussion of the good faith requirement to the inevitable discovery 
exception imposed by lower courts, see supra 148-150 and accompanying text. The general 
wisdom of a good faith requirement is beyond the scope of this Note, but the difficulties of 
administering such a test are clear: 
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States Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine the fate of 
Robert Williams. 
The Court reversed the Eighth Circuit's decision, and the active 
pursuit of an alternate line of investigation was relevant to the recogni­
tion in Nix of the inevitable discovery exception.64 Williams challenged 
the finding that the volunteer search party would have ultimately 
found the body, regardless of the Sixth Amendment violation by the 
police, as a "post hoc rationalization" unsupported by the record.65 At 
the suppression hearing before Williams's second trial, the prosecution 
introduced testimony that at 10:00 AM on the day of Williams's sur­
render, Agent Ruxlow of the Iowa Bureau of Criminal Investigation 
initiated a search with over two hundred volunteers. Ruxlow marked 
highway maps of Poweshiek and Jasper Counties, both near the 
Grinnell rest stop, into grids that could be searched by four to six peo­
ple. At about 3:00 PM that same day, after Williams had "volunteered 
to cooperate with the police," Detective Leaming "sent word" to 
Agent Ruxlow to meet them at the Grinnell truck stop, and the search 
was discontinued.66 At this time, Agent Ruxlow had neither subdi­
vided a map of nor sent any searchers into Polk County, where the 
body was found. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court showed great def­
erence to the lower courts' findings that if Williams had not been 
impermissibly interrogated, the search "would have resumed," contin-
"Bad faith" is not a self-defining concept. If we assume that constitutional rules are on the 
whole reasonable, there will usually be a certain degree of fault on the part of an officer who 
is found to have violated them. Presumably, bad faith means something more than that the 
officer acted in a manner that a court has found, in retrospect, to have been unreasonable, or 
coercive. 
Johnson, supra note 49, at 366. Further, "[t)he Iowa Supreme Court, which brought up the 
bad faith limitation in the first place, thought that Leaming must have acted in good faith 
because about half the judges, state and federal, who ruled on the issue found his actions 
lawful." Id. at 367. 
Even in Nix, which was, it must be remembered, the tenth court decision dealing with 
Williams's case, whether Detective Leaming had acted in bad faith was still being debated. 
Justice Stevens asked: 
What is the consequence of the shortcut that Detective Leaming took when he decided to 
question Williams in this case and not to wait an hour or so until he arrived in Des Moines? 
The answer is years and years of unnecessary but costly litigation. Instead of having a 1969 
conviction affirmed in routine fashion, the case is still alive 15 years later. Thanks to Detec­
tive Leaming, the State of Iowa has expended vast sums of money and countless hours of 
professional labor in his defense. 
Nix, 467 U.S. at 457-58 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
Justice White also wrote a short concurrence, solely to defend Detective Leaming, who 
"was no doubt acting as many competent police officers would have acted under similar cir­
cumstances and in light of the then-existing law. That five Justices later thought he was mis­
taken does not call for making him out to be a villain or for a lecture on deliberate police 
misconduct and its resulting costs to society." Id. at 451 (White, J., concurring). 
64. Id. at 448-50. 
65. Id. at 448. 
66. Id. at 449. 
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ued for two-and-a-half miles into Polk County, and the body would 
have been discovered within three to five hours.67 Thus, the active pur­
suit by law enforcement of an alternate, independent line of investiga­
tion at the time Williams's constitutional rights were violated reas­
sured the Nix majority that Powers's body would have been inevitably 
discovered.68 
67. Id. at 449-50 ("On this record it is clear that the search parties were approaching the 
actual location of the body, and we are satisfied, along with three courts earlier, that the vol­
unteer search teams would have resumed the search had Williams not earlier led the police 
to the body and the body inevitably would have been found."). 
At least one commentator has raised doubts about the certainty of this reading of the re­
cord. See Johnson, supra note 49, at 371-73. The Nix Court found important the fact that the 
body was discovered near a culvert, which the volunteers had been specifically instructed to 
search. Nix, 467 U.S. at 449. Johnson points out, however, that at the time of discovery, snow 
had already fallen and photographs show that both the body and the culvert were difficult to 
see. Johnson, supra note 49, at 372. Johnson also writes that contemporaneous reports writ­
ten by law enforcement directed a search of only the two counties east of Polk, and not Polk 
County itself. He writes: "From these reports one could infer that the search terminated at 
the Polk County line on December 26, 1968, because it was meant to end there, and not be­
cause Captain Leaming had obtained Williams' cooperation." Id. at 373. 
68. Professor Yale Kamisar likewise challenges the conventional wisdom that the facts 
in Nix are clear that, had Williams not "cooperated," the volunteer searchers "would have 
resumed" their efforts and inevitably discovered Powers's body in the manner presumed by 
the Court. Moreover, this uncertainty raises two additional problems with the active pursuit 
doctrine. Interview with Professor Yale Kamisar, Clarence Darrow Distinguished University 
Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School, in Ann Arbor, Mich. (Aug. 9, 2000) 
[hereinafter Kamisar Interview]. 
The first problem involves the faulty premise of the active pursuit doctrine's formulation. 
Courts that adhere to the requirement state that evidence may be admissible under the inevi­
table discovery exception if° "the government was actively pursuing a substantial, alternative 
line of investigation at the time of the constitutional violation." United States v. Williams, 181 
F.3d 945, 954 (8th Cir. 1999) (emphasis added). According to Professor Kamisar, for the ac­
tive pursuit doctrine to be effective, it should properly require that the government was en­
gaged in an ongoing, independent line of investigation at the time of the discovery of the evi­
dence. Otherwise, a significant delay between the time of the constitutional violation and the 
time the evidence was found undermines any determination that the subsequent discovery 
by lawful means would have legitimately been inevitable. The facts of Nix illustrate this 
point. In the "Christian burial speech," Detective Leaming admonished Williams that "(t]hey 
are predicting several inches of snow for tonight .. . and if you get a snow on top of (the 
body] you yourself may be unable to find it." Nix 467 U.S. at 435. The search was suspended 
at approximately 3:00 PM. Had Williams not led police to the body, it is reasonable to as­
sume that in late December it would soon be too dark to continue searching. The estimate 
that it would have taken the volunteer searchers another three to five hours to cover the two 
and one half miles into Polk County, which Agent Ruxlow had not yet even divided into 
grids, indicates that the earliest the body would have been discovered, if at all, was at some 
point the next day. If not then, of course it probably would have been found eventually, but 
when and in what condition? After the snow melted in the spring? After the body had begun 
to deteriorate? If law enforcement need only have initiated an independent investigation at 
the time of the constitutional violation, especially when the challenged evidence is a corpse 
(which arguably always will be found sooner or later), the active pursuit doctrine does little 
to establish that discovery by lawful means was inevitable. Kamisar Interview. 
The second, related problem with the active pursuit doctrine is ease of administration; 
that is, it is hard to tell when pursuit is "active" as opposed to "passive." Again looking to 
the facts of Nix, the volunteer searchers had suspended their efforts before Williams took the 
police to the location of the body. Therefore, this pursuit should more accurately be de­
scribed as "passive," and the doubts as to whether the searchers would have discovered the 
body demonstrate the broad sweep of the term "active" pursuit. Consider also the following 
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B. The Doctrine: A ctive Pursuit was not Required 
253 
Although active pursuit was both present and relevant in Nix, no­
where in the opinion did the majority explicitly hold that it was neces­
sary for the inevitable discovery exception to apply.69 As this much is 
uncontested, those trying to limit the inevitable discovery exception by 
imposing an active pursuit requirement find support elsewhere in Nix 
- the concurring opinion of Justice Stevens and the dissenting opin­
ion of Justice Brennan Qoined by Justice Marshall).70 Because both 
opinions discuss the majority decision as requiring active pursuit, de­
fendants have argued that the inevitable discovery exception is thus 
limited,71 and courts have even relied on this alternate language as the 
proper formulation of Nix's holding.72 These efforts should be properly 
hypothetical: following a murder, law enforcement officials typically go to nearby pawn 
shops to see if any guns resembling the murder weapon have recently been sold there. As­
sume the police visit all the local pawn shops, and find nothing. They then proceed to per­
form an unlawful search of a suspect's residence, where they find a pawn ticket for a gun sold 
to a pawn shop in another·town. After the police retrieve the firearm, the defendant moves 
to suppress the evidence as the fruit of the unlawful search of the residence. The prosecution 
could argue that, but for the illegal search, they would have eventually gone to surrounding 
towns to canvas pawn shops there, and thus they would have inevitably discovered the mur­
der weapon. Should the investigation of the pawn shops be considered "active" or "passive" 
pursuit? If the court finds the officers' testimony to be credible, the answer would be the 
former. In either outcome, these semantic difficulties highlight the problem of determining 
when pursuit legitimately was active, and limit the doctrine's usefulness in determining when 
discovery was inevitable. Id. 
69. United States v. Thomas, 955 F.2d 207, 210 (4th Cir. 1992) ("The Supreme Court 
majority in Nix did not require an alternate line of investigation, although a concurring Jus­
tice and two dissenting Justices stated that the inevitable discovery exception should have 
that prerequisite."). 
70. See Lamberth, supra note 24, at 146-47 ("The significance of the active pursuit re­
quirement is evidenced by the fact that the concurring and dissenting opinions in [Nix] 
agreed with the majority on the criticalness of the ongoing investigation . . . .  This is especially 
persuasive considering the Court's discussion in [Nix] gave no indication that the Court 
would have adopted the inevitable discovery doctrine absent a showing of the proximity of 
the ongoing search of the victim's body."). 
71. See United States v. Silvestri, 787 F.2d 736, 742 (1st Cir. 1986) (considering the "de­
fendant's claim that the inevitable discovery exception applies only where the legal process 
for discovering the evidence has been set in motion at the time of the illegal discovery. We 
have looked closely at the Court's opinion in Nix to see if such a holding may be found there 
and, in our view, Nix does not provide a conclusive answer on this issue. To the extent that 
the Court's holding may be limited by the facts of the case before it, it is possible to narrow 
the holding of the case, as was done by the dissent" to require active pursuit. "Nonetheless, 
the majority did not say that discovery could only be found inevitable if the legal means of 
obtaining the evidence were in progress at the time the evidence was illegally discovered. It 
concluded only that the inevitability of the discovery was demonstrated by the ongoing na­
ture of the search and the progress it had already made."). 
72. United States v. Owens, 782 F.2d 146, 152 (10th Cir. 1986) (stating that in Nix "Jus­
tices Brennan and Marshall, in dissent . . .  capsulized the majority's holding," and then re­
fusing to apply the inevitable discovery exception because "the unconstitutional search . . .  
tainted the only police investigation that was ongoing. Clearly these officers were not con­
ducting an independent investigation that would have uncovered the [evidence]"). 
254 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 99:238 
understood as misguided, however, as they unjustifiably limit Nix's 
formulation of the inevitable discovery doctrine. 
Concurring in the Court's judgment, Justice Stevens indicated that 
the ongoing, independent line of investigation was an indispensable 
factor in establishing the inevitability of the discovery of Powers's 
body: 
The uncertainty as to whether the body would have been discovered can 
be resolved in [the state's] favor here only because petitioner . . .  ad­
duced evidence demonstrating that at the time of the constitutional viola­
tion an investigation was already under way which, in the natural and 
probable course of events, would have soon discovered the body (em­
phasis added).73 
Justice Brennan's dissent went even further, unequivocally stating that 
the majority had held that active pursuit was required: 
The Court concludes that unconstitutionally obtained evidence may be 
admitted at trial if it inevitably would have been discovered in the same 
condition by an independent line of investigation that was already being 
pursued when the constitutional violation occurred.74 
While this statement, when considered alone, could be viewed as an 
adroit move to narrow the majority's holding,75 the force of Justice 
Brennan's attempt is undermined by the statement that immediately 
followed. He continued: 
As has every Federal Court of Appeals previously addressing this issue, 
see ante, at 440-41, n. 2, I agree that in these circumstances the 'inevitable 
discovery' exception to the exclusionary rule is consistent with the re­
quirements of the Constitution."76 
The defect in this seemingly simple statement of fact is that the over­
whelming majority of the circuit cases cited by the majority at footnote 
two77 did not even discuss, much less require, "these circumstances": 
73. Nix, 467 U.S. at 456-57 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
74. Id. at 459 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
75. Ascribing such a motive to Justice Brennan hardly seems inappropriate. As the jus­
tice himself once stated, "The dissent is . . .  commonly used to emphasize the limits of a ma­
jority decision that sweeps, so far as the dissenters are concerned, unnecessarily broadly - a 
sort of 'damage control' mechanism." William J. Brennan, Lecture, In Defense of Dissents, 
37 HAST INGS L.J. 427, 430 (1986). 
76. Nix, 467 U.S. at 459 (Brennan, J. dissenting) (emphasis added). 
77. The cases cited by the Nix majority were: Wayne v. United States, 318 F.2d 205 
(D.C. Cir. 1963), United States v. Bienvenue, 632 F.2d 910 (1st Cir. 1980), United States v. 
Fisher, 700 F.2d 780 (2d Cir. 1983), Virgin Is. v. Gereau, 502 F.2d 914 (3d Cir. 1974), United 
States v. Seohnlein, 423 F.2d 1051 (4th Cir. 1970), United States v. Brookins, 614 F.2d 1037 
(5th Cir. 1980), Papp v. Jago, 656 F.2d 221 (6th Cir. 1981), United States ex rel. Owens v. 
Twomey, 508 F.2d 858 (7th Cir. 1974), United States v. Apker, 705 F.2d 293 (8th Cir. 1983), 
United States v. Schmidt, 573 F.2d 1057 (9th Cir. 1978), United States v. Romero, 692 F.2d 
699 (10th Cir. 1982), United States v. Roper, 681 F.2d 1354 (11th Cir. 1982). See id. at 440 
n.2. 
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namely, the presence of active pursuit.78 Thus, despite Justice 
Brennan's effort to alter the scope of the majority's opinion,79 the 
tenuous foundation of his reasoning weakens the persuasiveness of the 
dissent's attempt to read an active pursuit requirement where none 
was written.80 
Another tactic employed by lower courts that require active pur­
suit is to claim fidelity to the facts of Nix, and therefore consistency 
with the Court's general formulation of the inevitable discovery excep­
tion.81 In other words, because the Nix Court was not confronted with 
78. In only two of the twelve cases cited in footnote two of Nix was active pursuit re­
quired in invoking the inevitable discovery exception. Romero, 692 F.2d at 704; Brookins, 
614 F.2d at 1042. In fact, the phrase "active pursuit" appears to have been coined by the 
Brookins Court. However, the Brookins Court acknowledged that, in requiring active pur­
suit, it was altering the inevitable discovery standard recognized by its sister circuits: 
We have used the phrase 'inevitable discovery exception' because that is the designation 
employed most frequently by other circuits and commentators . . . .  Unlike precedents from 
those circuits, the ruling in this case is based on two additional factors: first, that the prosecu­
tor demonstrated that the leads, which made discovery inevitable, were possessed by the po­
lice and were being actively pursued by the police prior to the occurrence of the illegal police 
conduct. . . .  
Id. at 1042 n.2. 
The Romero Court was less emphatic about establishing a per se active pursuit rule: "We 
recognize the danger of admitting unlawfully obtained evidence on the strength of some 
judge's speculation that it would have been discovered legally anyway, but that danger is di­
minished when, as here, the evidence clearly would have been discovered within a short time 
through a lawful investigation already underway." 692 F.2d at 704 (internal citation omitted). 
Note, however, that the Tenth Circuit today no longer follows Romero's adherence to the 
active pursuit doctrine. See United States v. Larsen, 127 F.3d 984, 987 (10th Cir. 1997) ("The 
fact that another investigation was already underway when a constitutional violation oc­
curred is strong proof that it was independent of the illegal investigation, as Nix . . .  illus­
trate[s). However, it is possible for an investigation that begins after the violation to be inde­
pendent of the illegal investigation."). 
79. Despite ostensible agreement with the inevitable discovery exception in theory, Jus­
tice Brennan was highly critical of the majority's "zealous efforts to emasculate the exclu­
sionary rule." Nix, 467 U.S. at 459 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
80. It is interesting to note that those on both sides of the debate of whether active pur­
suit was part of Nix's holding find additional support in the Court's later decision of Murray 
v. United States, 487 U.S. 533 (1988). The Murray Court held that evidence may be admitted 
under the independent source exception to the exclusionary rule if police initially discover 
evidence illegally, and the same evidence is again discovered during a subsequent search 
conducted pursuant to a valid warrant obtained independently of the illegal search. Id. at 
542. At least one commentator has argued that "Justice Marshall pointed out in his dissent in 
Murray that active pursuit was required by the Nix decision." Bloom, supra note 28, at 101 
(citing Murray, 487 U.S. at 544-45). In contrast, one circuit judge has asserted that the "al­
ternate investigation" (i.e., active pursuit) requirement purportedly advanced in Nix was 
"squarely rejected" by the Supreme Court in Murray. See United States v. Johnson, 22 F.3d 
674, 686 n.4 (6th Cir. 1994) (Suhrheinrich, J., dissenting). 
81. See United States v. Cherry, 759 F.2d 1196, 1204 (5th Cir. 1985) (finding the active 
pursuit requirement to be "fully consistent" with Nix, where "the search was already under­
way in the general vicinity where the body was found when the police initiated the illegal 
interrogation."); United States v. Satterfield, 743 F.2d 827, 847 (11th Cir. 1984) (noting the 
Nix Court's "general statement" of the inevitable discovery exception was based on the fact 
that " [t)he search party there was well on its way to uncovering the body when the suspect 
revealed its precise location. Thus Nix is not inconsistent with the rule in this circuit that the 
256 Michigan Law Review (Vol. 99:238 
a fact pattern tliat lacked an ongoing, alternate line of investigation, it 
had no occasion to announce whether the inevitable discovery <�xcep­
tion applied only in cases involving active pursuit.82 Therefore, it is 
claimed, by not explicitly rejecting the active pursuit requirement, the 
Nix Court did not affect the active pursuit requirement,83 or even im­
pliedly affirmed it.84 
This argument, while literally accurate, is too limiting.85 First, the 
language of Nix indicates that the Court by no means intended its 
holding to apply only to the fact pattern of the instant case. For exam­
ple, at one point the Court stated: 
If the prosecution can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that 
the information ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by 
lawful means - here the volunteers ' search - then . . .  the evidence 
should be received (emphasis added).86 
The apparent syllogism of this statement is that the Court announced 
the broad premise of the inevitable discovery rule, applied it to the 
specific facts, and drew a conclusion. The most logical reading of Nix's 
holding, therefore, is that the Court viewed active pursuit as sufficient 
in this case to establish inevitability, but not a necessary element that 
must be proven in every case. 
Second, courts that reject the active pursuit requirement appropri­
ately do so on the ground that it is a limitation of the Nix Court's in­
tended formulation of the inevitable discovery exception.87 It seems 
police must possess and be actively pursuing the lawful avenue of discovery when the illegal­
ity occurred"). 
82. Satterfield, 743 F.2d at 847 ("In adopting . . .  the inevitable discovery rule, the Court 
was not presented with a situation in which the lawful means leading to an 'inevitable' dis­
covery had not yet been acquired by the police at the time the illegal evidence was seized."). 
83. Id. at 846 ("Except for the application of its rule to the specific facts before the [Nix] 
Court and its holding that the Government must establish the inevitability of discovery by a 
preponderance of the evidence, the Supreme Court was silent as to what constitutes an 'in­
evitable' discovery under the doctrine. Because the Nix decision is consistent with the previ­
ous case law of this circuit, we look to our earlier decisions for guidance in determining 
whether the facts of this case come within the exception."). The Satterfield Court, therefore, 
concluded that "[t]he Supreme Court's recent pronouncement in Nix does not affect" the 
active pursuit requirement. Id at 847. 
84. See Cherry, 759 F.2d at 1205 n.10 (stating that Nix is "generally supportive" of the 
Fifth Circuit's prior holding that active pursuit is required, because, inter alia, "the Supreme 
Court stated in (Nix] that the inevitable discovery exception 'involves no speculative ele­
ments but focuses on demonstrated historical facts.' This comment implies that the alternate 
means of obtaining the evidence must at least be in existence and, at least to some degree, 
imminent, if yet unrealized" (internal citation omitted)). 
85. United States v. Boatwright, 822 F.2d 862, 864 (9th Cir. 1987) (stating that "though 
the existence of two independent inquiries in progress comports with the facts of Nix . . .  the 
rationale of Nix is not so limited."). 
86. Nix, 467 U.S. at 444. 
87. See United States v. Larsen, 127 F.3d 984, 987 (10th Cir. 1997) (noting that "the ma­
jority opinion in Nix" did not "limit the inevitable discovery exception to lines of investiga­
tion that were already underway.") (emphasis added); Boatwright, 822 F.2d at 864 ("though 
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counterintuitive for lower courts to impose an additional factor, be­
yond those established by the Supreme Court, upon a doctrine that, by 
its very nature, is designed to mitigate the exclusionary rule's unduly 
harsh effects on law enforcement.88 To reply that the active pursuit 
doctrine provides a necessary check against the unwarranted applica­
tion of the inevitable discovery exception is actually to argue against 
the exception itself, despite the Court's recognition of the doctrine's 
validity. Phrased somewhat differently, the addition of the active pur­
suit doctrine may be justified only if one presupposes that the Court's 
formulation of the inevitable discovery exception is flawed, and there­
fore requires correction by lower judges.89 It is axiomatic to assert that 
the inevitable discovery exception cannot be crafted and applied so as 
to eradicate the fundamental constitutional guarantees enforced by 
the exclusionary rule.w But to make active pursuit a requirement 
unsoundly assumes that the Nix Court did not already perform this 
crucial calculus,91 and too deeply infringes upon the Court's authority 
the existence of two independent inquiries in progress comports with the facts of Nix . . .  the 
rationale of Nix is not so limited.") (emphasis added); United States v. Silvestri, 787 F.2d 736, 
742 (1st Cir. 1986) (acknowledging that "[t]o the extent that the Court's holding [in Nix] may 
be limited by the facts of the case before it, it is possible to narrow the holding of the case . . , 
so as to limit the admission of evidence [to circumstances involving active pursuit]," but re­
jecting the limitation in the same opinion) (emphases added). 
88. See Nix, 467 U.S. at 443, 446 ("This Court has accepted the argument that the way to 
ensure [constitutional and statutory] protections [against police misconduct] is to exclude 
evidence seized as a result of such violations notwithstanding the high social cost of letting 
persons obviously guilty go unpunished for their crimes," but "[e]xclusion of physical evi­
dence that would inevitably have been discovered adds nothing to either the integrity or 
fairness of a criminal trial."). 
89. See Cohn, supra note 24, at 754 ("The inevitable discovery exception to the exclu­
sionary rule is a logical extension of the doctrines of independent source and attenuation and 
can be a valuable addition to the criminal justice system. Courts can apply it in a way that 
protects the law enforcement interests of society, and also provides substantial deterrence of 
unlawful police activity and protection of the rights of criminal suspects. Inevitable discov­
ery, however, must be applied with caution and discretion. A mechanical application of the 
doctrine will encourage unconstitutional shortcuts such as those taken by the Court in 
[Nix]."). 
90. See Johnson, supra note 49, at 364 ("[A] properly administered inevitable discovery 
exception gives the authorities only what they would have had if they had not violated the 
Constitution."). 
91. The Nix Court explicitly discussed the balancing of values that must be undertaken 
when developing exceptions to the exclusionary rule. At his second trial, Williams argued 
that "the Court may not balance competing values in deciding whether the challenged evi­
dence was properly admitted" because "unlike the exclusionary rule in the Fourth Amend­
ment context, the essential purpose of which is to deter police misconduct, the Sixth 
Amendment exclusionary rule is designed to protect the right to a fair trial and the integrity 
of the factfinding process." Nix, 467 U. S. at 446. The majority explicitly disagreed, stating: 
Fairness can be assured by placing the State and the accused in the same positions they 
would have been in had the impermissible conduct not taken place. However, if the govern­
ment can prove that the evidence would have been obtained inevitably and, therefore, would 
have been admitted regardless of any overreaching by the police, there is no rational basis to 
keep that evidence from the jury in order to ensure the fairness of the trial proceedings. In 
that situation, the State has gained no advantage at trial and the defendant has suffered no 
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as the ultimate arbiter of the Constitution to establish doctrines that 
are binding upon lower courts. 
II. PROPERLY LIMITING THE SCOPE OF THE INEVITABLE 
DISCOVERY EXCEPTION 
Exceptions to the exclusionary rule must be detailed enough to 
produce reasonably uniform outcomes, but also flexible enough to ad­
dress adequately the limitless range of fact patterns encountered by 
courts.92 In determining whether law enforcement activity violates the 
Fourth Amendment, the Supreme Court has "consistently eschewed 
bright-line rules, instead emphasizing the fact-specific nature of the 
reasonableness inquiry" into the totality of the circumstances.93 The 
active pursuit doctrine functions as precisely such a disfavored per se 
rule, limiting any reasonableness inquiry solely to the narrow issue of 
whether the police had engaged in an ongoing, alternate line of inves­
tigation at the time of the official misconduct.94 This Part demonstrates 
that active pursuit is a formalistic doctrine, and unnecessary in light of 
an alternative "independent circumstances" test that permits a more 
inclusive inquiry into inevitability without sacrificing criminal defen-
prejudice. Indeed, suppression of the evidence would operate to undermine the adversary 
system by putting the State in a worse position than it would have occupied without any po­
lice misconduct. Williams' argument that inevitable discovery constitutes impermissible bal­
ancing of values is without merit. 
Nix, 467 U.S. at 447. 
92. See Stewart, supra note 4, at 1393 ("The occupation of a judge requires application 
of [the Fourth Amendment's] sweeping language to cases presenting the infinite variety of 
factual situations that arise in real life. The art of being a judge, if there is such an art, is in 
announcing clear rules in the context of these infinitely varied cases, rules that can be under­
stood and observed by conscientious government officials."). 
93. Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996) (rejecting the per se rule of the Ohio Su­
preme Court that before officers may attempt to obtain consent to interrogate citizens 
stopped for traffic offenses they must be informed that they are "free to go"). 
94. See, e.g., United States v. Conner, 127 F.3d 663, 668 (8th Cir. 1997) ("Given . . .  the 
fact that the government offers no concrete evidence that police explored any alternative 
investigatory approach, we find no basis to apply the inevitable discovery exception to this 
case."); United States v. Wilson, 36 F.3d 1298, 1305 (5th Cir. 1994) ("Because there has been 
an insufficient showing that the government was actively pursuing a substantial alternate line 
of investigation at the time of this warrantless search and seizure, the [evidence] was not ad­
missible under the 'inevitable discovery' doctrine."). 
This is not to say, of course, that if the prosecution may establish active pursuit by law 
enforcement then evidence is a priori admissible. The active pursuit requirement is only one 
prong of the inevitable discovery test. See, e.g., Wilson, 36 F.3d at 1304 ("In order for the 'in­
evitable discovery' rule to apply the government must demonstrate, by a preponderance of 
the evidence, both (1) that there is a reasonable probability that the contested evidence 
would have been discovered by lawful means in the absence of police misconduct and (2) 
that the government was actively pursuing a substantial alternate line of investigation at the 
time of the constitutional violation."). Therefore, although the active pursuit doctrine itself 
operates as a per se rule of exclusion, satisfying this single prong is not the end of the analy­
sis. If the police were in active pursuit, but the prosecution cannot otherwise demonstrate a 
reasonable probability of inevitable discovery, the evidence would still be suppressed. 
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dants' Fourth Amendment rights. Section II.A argues that the active 
pursuit requirement, operating as a bright-line rule, is contrary to the 
Supreme Court's recent Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, and un­
wisely constrains the scope of the inevitable discovery exception. Sec­
tion 11.B advocates the adoption of a standard under which inevitabil­
ity, the key element of a just application of the exception, may be 
legitimately established in the absence of active pursuit. 
A. Formalism versus Flexibility 
Over the past two decades, the Supreme Court has expressed fre­
quent hostility towards narrow, bright-line Fourth Amendment rules, 
adhering instead to standards that permit a broader investigation into 
surrounding circumstances.95 The Court's reluctance to adopt per se 
rules seems due, in large part, to the infinite and unpredictable search 
and seizure scenarios that defy advance judicial contemplation.96 
Commentators, on the other hand, assert that it is exactly because po­
lice regularly confront such diverse situations under intense pressure 
that their decisionmaking processes benefit from judicial rules.97 
95. See Robinette, 519 U.S. at 39; see also Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 440, 439 
(1991) ("The Florida Supreme Court erred in adopting a per se rule. [Instead w]e adhere to 
the rule that, in order to determine whether a particular encounter constitutes a seizure, a 
court must consider all the circumstances surrounding the encounter . . . .  "); Michigan v. 
Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 572-73 (1988) ("Both petitioner and respondent, it seems to us, in 
their attempts to fashion a bright-line rule applicable to all investigatory pursuits, have failed 
to heed this Court's clear direction that any assessment as to whether police conduct 
amounts to a seizure implicating the Fourth Amendment must take into account 'all of the 
circumstances surrounding the incident' in each individual case. Rather than adopting either 
rule proposed by the parties and determining that an investigatory pursuit is or is not neces­
sarily a seizure under the Fourth Amendment, we adhere to our traditional contextual ap­
proach . . . .  ") (internal citations omitted); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 506 (1983) ("We 
do not suggest that there is a litmus-paper test for distinguishing a consensual encounter 
from a seizure or for determining when a seizure exceeds the bounds of an investigative 
stop."). 
But note, however, that Chief Justice Rehnquist, who authored the Court's opinion in 
Robinette, later that same term wrote the decision in Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 413 
n.l (1997), in which he stated that although "we typically avoid per se rules concerning 
searches and seizures does not mean that we have always done so." 
Cf. Dickerson v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 2326, 2329-30 (2000) (holding that Miranda v. 
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) and its progeny continue to "govern the admissibility of state­
ments made during custodial interrogation in both state and federal courts"). The majority 
opinion in Dickerson, also authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist, noted that: "The Miranda 
opinion itself begins by stating that the Court granted certiorari . . .  'to give concrete constitu­
tional guidelines for law enforcement agencies and courts to follow.' "). Id. at 2333-34 (quot­
ing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 441-42). 
96. See Royer, 460 U.S. at 506-07 ("Even in the discrete category of airport encounters, 
there will be endless variations in .the facts and circumstances, so much variation that it is 
unlikely that the courts can reduce to a sentence or a paragraph a rule that will provide un­
arguable answers to the question whether there has been an unreasonable search or seizure 
in violation of the Fourth Amendment."). 
97. See, e.g., Nadine Strossen, The Fourth Amendment in the Balance: Accurately Setting 
the Scales through the Least Intrusive Analysis, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1173, 1193-94 (1988) 
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A per se active pursuit requirement is unwarranted in this context, 
however, because the principal justification for bright-line Fourth 
Amendment rules is to provide guidance to the officers themselves.98 
But the inevitable discovery exception is a doctrine applied by the ju­
diciary, not by law enforcement. On the basis of this underlying ra­
tionale, it can be argued that bright-line Fourth Amendment rules are 
inapposite to the inevitable discovery exception. After all, if a court is 
faced with the decision of whether to avoid the effect of the exclusion­
ary rule, there necessarily already has been a constitutional violation 
by law enforcement.99 It seems inappropriate, to say the least, to de­
velop a bright-line rule that informs police how to "properly" violate 
someone's Fourth Amendment rights. The active pursuit doctrine pro­
vides instruction to courts, not guidance to law enforcement, and the 
benefits that flow from per se rules that confine police conduct do not 
likewise extend to circumscribing the discretion of judges. 
Courts that reject the active pursuit doctrine have accurately char­
acterized the requirement as a disfavored bright-line rule.100 These cir­
cuits decline to engage in the unrealistic and impractical effort to de­
lineate a per se rule that anticipates all (or even most) of the search 
and seizure situations that trigger the inevitable discovery exception, 
and opt instead for a standard that reserves for judges the flexibility to 
analyze fact patterns in a manner more comprehensive than focusing 
("Decisions implicating fourth amendment rights are often made by individual law enforce­
ment officials responding to the exigencies of specific, rapidly unfolding situations. There­
fore, the judicial enunciation of fixed categorical rules is especially important to promote 
both law enforcement goals and fourth amendment freedoms."). But see Albert W. 
Alschuler, Bright Line Fever and the Fourth Amendment, 45 U. PITI. L. REV. 227, 242 (1984) 
(arguing that " 'bright line' fourth amendment rules usually fail on their own terms"). 
98. See, e.g. , The Supreme Court, 1996 Term: Leading Cases, 111 HARV. L. REV. 197, 
305 (1997) ("Rules are thought to provide guidance to the police at the expense of precise 
conformity to the underlying rationales, and a reasonableness test is thought to assure full 
consideration of the varying circumstances at the expense of predictability."); Wayne R. 
LaFave, The Fourth Amendment in an lmperfect World: On Drawing "Bright Lines" and 
"Good Faith," 43 U. PITI. L. REV. 307, 320, 333 (1982) ("Fourth Amendment doctrine, 
given force and effect by the exclusionary rule, is primarily intended to regulate the police in 
their day-to-day activities and thus ought to be expressed in terms that are readily applicable 
by the police in the context of the law enforcement activities in which they are necessarily 
engaged.") (quoting Wayne R. LaFave, "Case-by-Case Adjudication" Versus "Standardized 
Procedures": The Robinson Dilemma, 1974 SUP. Cr. REV. 127, 141) ("[I]t is extremely im­
portant that fourth amendment doctrine be expressed in terms understandable to the police, 
to whom, after all, it is directed.")). 
99. See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 (1984) ("It is clear that the cases implementing 
the exclusionary rule 'begin with the premise that the challenged evidence is in some sense 
the product of illegal government activity.' ") (quoting United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 
471 (1980)). 
100. See United States v. Thomas, 955 F.2d 207, 210 (4th Cir. 1992) (rejecting the active 
pursuit doctrine as a "blanket requirement"); United States v. Silvestri, 787 F.2d 736, 745 (1st 
Cir. 1986) (criticizing the active pursuit requirement as a "bright-line rule" that, in some 
situations, "goes too far"). 
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solely on active pursuit.101 This reasonable approach allows for the in­
evitable discovery doctrine to develop on a case-by-case basis,102 and 
prevents a formalistic application of the exception that could result in 
the unwarranted suppression of evidence where the facts demonstrate 
inevitability, but do not otherwise include an ongoing, alternate line of 
investigation.103 
B. Establishing Inevitability Without A ctive Pursuit 
While an alternate, ongoing investigation may be one way to satisfy 
the courts that the police inevitably would have discovered the uncon­
stitutionally obtained evidence by lawful means,104 it need not be the 
only way.105 Indeed, the active pursuit doctrine erroneously presup­
poses that this requirement is indispensable to protect citizens' Fourth 
Amendment rights against a thoughtless application of the inevitable 
discovery exception.106 The overriding concern of the Nix Court was 
that "inevitable discovery involves no speculative elements . . . .  "107 To 
safeguard against such speculation, courts must "focus[] on demon­
strated historical facts capable of ready verification or impeach­
ment. "108 The phrase "demonstrated historical facts" is somewhat 
misleading, as a showing of inevitable discovery is necessarily based on 
101. See United States v. Ford, 22 F.3d 374, 377 (1st Cir. 1994) (adhering to a "flexible 
standard, [where] independence and inevitability remain the cornerstones of the analysis"); 
Silvestri, 787 F.2d at 746 ("Rather than setting up an inflexible "ongoing" test . . .  we suggest 
that the analysis focus on the questions of independence and inevitability and remain flexible 
enough to handle the many different fact patterns which will be presented."). 
102. See Ford, 22 F.3d at 377 ("The specific facts of each case will determine the re­
quirements necessary to prove independence and inevitability."); United States v. 
Boatwright, 822 F.2d 862, 864 (9th Cir. 1987) ("The facts of this case do not justify a compre­
hensive definition of inevitable discovery. The doctrine is best developed on a case by case 
basis."). 
103. See Boatwright, 822 F.2d at 864 ("There will be instances where, based on historical 
facts, inevitability is demonstrated in such a compelling way that operation of the exclusion­
ary rule is a mechanical and entirely unrealistic bar, preventing the trier of fact from learning 
what would have come to light in any case.)." 
104. See United States v. Larsen, 127 F.3d 984, 987 (10th Cir. 1997) ("The fact that an­
other investigation was already underway when a constitutional violation occurred is strong 
proof that it was independent of the illegal investigation . . . .  "); Silvestri, 787 F.2d at 746 ("A 
Nix-like case may well require that active pursuit of an investigation be underway to satisfy 
the test of inevitability and independence."). 
105. See Larsen, 127 F.3d at 987 ("[I]t is possible for an investigation that begins after 
the violation to be independent of the illegal investigation."). 
106. See Lamberth, supra note 24, at 146 ("Requiring the police to be actively pursuing 
an ongoing alternate legal line of investigation at the time the illegality occurred is of para­
mount importance to the satisfactory determination of inevitability."). 
107. Nix v Williams, 467 U.S. 431 ,  444-45 n.5 (1984). 
108. Id. at 445 n.5. 
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hypothetical circumstances.109 It is therefore crucial that the prosecu­
tion must prove by a preponderance of the evidence not merely that 
the police could have legally discovered the challenged evidence, but 
that they would actually have done so.11° 
There exists an alternative standard that allows for the prosecution 
to establish inevitability even in the absence of active pursuit, but only 
by proving demonstrated historical facts that were discovered separate 
from the constitutional misconduct. This "independent circumstances" 
test111 "requires that the fact or likelihood that makes the discovery in­
evitable arise from circumstances other than those disclosed by the il­
legal search itself."112 This standard was first announced in a 1987 deci­
sion, United States v. Boatwright,113 authored by then-Ninth Circuit 
Judge Anthony M. Kennedy.114 In this case, while attempting to exe­
cute a lawful probation search of Rocky Boatwright's residence, offi­
cers first engaged in an illegal search of a another structure on the 
premises, a converted garage, where they discovered illegal weapons 
in the possession of Rocky's brother, the defendant Rickie 
Boatwright.115 The police then conducted a lawful search of the main 
109. See United States v. Allen, 159 F.3d 832, 840 (4th Cir. 1998) ("A finding of inevita­
ble discovery necessarily rests on facts that did not occur. However, by definition the occur­
rence of these facts must have been likely, indeed 'inevitable,' absent the government's mis­
conduct."). 
110. See id. (refusing to apply the inevitable exception on the ground that "[w]e have no 
doubt that [the officer] could have used the [drug sniffingJ .dog, but whether she would have 
presents an entirely different question."); United States v. Eng, 971 F.2d 854, 861 (2d Cir. 
1992) ("The [inevitable discovery] exception requires the district court to determine, viewing 
affairs as they existed at the instant before the unlawful search, what would have happened 
had the unlawful search never occurred."); United States v. Namer, 835 F.2d 1084, 1088 (5th 
Cir. 1988) (stating that in order for the inevitable discovery exception to apply, "at a mini­
mum, the government would have to offer a theory as to the manner in which agents would 
have made their discovery. We agree with commentators that emphasis is on 'would' not 
'might' or 'could.' ") (internal citations omitted). 
111. The "independent circumstances" test should not be confused with the "independ­
ent source" doctrine. The latter "allows admission of evidence that has been discovered by 
means wholly independent of any constitutional violation.'' Nix, 467 U.S. at 443. Under the 
independent source doctrine, "evidence that was in fact discovered lawfully, and not as a di­
rect or indirect result of illegal activity, is admissible." United States v. Herrold, 962 F.2d 
1131, 1140 (3d Cir. 1992). The independent circumstances test, part of the inevitable discov­
ery doctrine, differs in that the court must still make a hypothetical finding that, if the unlaw­
ful search would not have first found the evidence in question, it would have ultimately been 
discovered by lawful means. 
112. United States v. Boatwright, 822 F.2d 862, 864-65 (9th Cir. 1987). 
113. 822 F.2d 862 (9th Cir. 1987). 
114. It is interesting to note that two members of the current Supreme Court have par­
ticipated in decisions as Circuit Judges that repudiated the active pursuit doctrine, Justice 
Kennedy in Boatwright, and then-First Circuit Judge Steven G. Breyer in United States v. 
Silvestri, 787 F.2d 736 (1st Cir. 1986). 
115. Boatwright, 822 F.2d at 863. Rocky Boatwright, a convicted drug manufacturer, was 
subject to involuntary searches by the terms of his probation agreement. After Rocky 
Boatwright moved to Paradise, California, a probation officer from his home county was ac­
companied by Paradise police to his new residence at 1024 Maple Drive to conduct a search, 
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residence, where they found incriminating evidence of narcotics pro­
duction. They also performed a third search of a trailer on the 
grounds, which disclosed a methamphetamine lab.116 The officers 
summoned to the scene an agent of the Drug Enforcement Admini­
stration, who later testified that on the basis of the drug evidence 
found in the main residence and trailer, he would have secured a 
search warrant for the garage and inevitably discovered the guns.117 
Rocky moved to suppress the evidence of the guns, arguing that the 
inevitable discovery exception was inapplicable because two inde­
pendent investigations were not in progress (i.e., there was no active 
pursuit) at the time of the illegal search and seizure.118 The Ninth Cir­
cuit rejected the claim that active pursuit was required, but nonethe­
less declined to apply the inevitable discovery exception, reasoning 
that: 
There is nothing outside the unlawful search itself that points to the in­
evitable discovery of weapons in control of this defendant. Applying the 
inevitable discovery doctrine here would, therefore, permit the govern­
ment to ignore search requirements at any convenient point in the inves­
tigation, and would go well beyond the present scope of the doctrine. 
This we decline to do.119 
Thus, the independent circumstances test allows for a broader inquiry 
beyond simply active pursuit, while still safeguarding defendant's 
Fourth Amendment rights. 
The Ninth Circuit is not alone in rejecting the active pursuit doc­
trine in favor of a more inclusive inquiry into inevitability. The Fourth 
Circuit also adopted the independent circumstances standard in 
Boatwright,120 and in doing so, likewise demonstrated an unwillingness 
to limit the inevitable discovery exception. In United States v. 
Thomas,121 hotel employees suspected that the defendant might be 
interview him, and learn of his activities. Upon arrival, the officers called for Rocky, and he 
emerged from a converted garage that bore a separate address, 1024A Maple Drive. Rocky 
smelled of a strong chemical odor, and the officers, none of whom were trained to identify 
drug odors, decided to enter 1024A. Inside they found a partial drug laboratory and a closed 
door. They left the converted garage, asked Rocky if anyone else was inside 1024A, and pro­
ceeded back inside and opened the door. There they found Rickie Boatwright attempting to 
conceal two sawed-off shotguns. The officers seized the guns and arrested Rickie, who was 
subsequently convicted on weapons charges. Id. 
116. Id. at 863-64. 
117. Id. at 864. 
118. Id. 
119. Id. at 865. 
120. See United States v. Thomas, 955 F.2d 207, 210-11 (4th Cir. 1992) ("[T]his court 
believes the most sensible examination of inevitable discovery is [in] United States v. 
Boatwright . . . .  We agree that the fact making discovery inevitable must 'arise from circum­
stances other than those disclosed by the illegal search itself.' "). 
121. Id. 
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dealing drugs from his room, and contacted law enforcement.122 Offi­
cers proceeded to unlawfully enter and search Thomas's room, finding 
large sums of cash in wrappers from a bank that had been robbed the 
previous day.123 Officers began surveillance from across the hall, and 
subsequently stopped and questioned another person entering and ex­
iting Thomas's room, who implicated Thomas in the bank robbery.124 
The government conceded that the initial search was illegal, but relied 
on a "string of conjecture" to argue that the evidence would have been 
inevitably discovered.125 Because only the initial illegal search for 
drugs led to the ultimate discovery of the stolen bank money, the 
Fourth Circuit suppressed the evidence and reversed Thomas's convic­
tion.126 
Courts that adhere to the active pursuit doctrine assert that the re­
quirement is necessary to ensure that law enforcement's "mere asser­
tion of inevitable discovery must fail."127 But these words of caution do 
not counsel against an independent circumstances test that operates 
with equal force as the active pursuit doctrine, effectively precluding 
law enforcement from rehabilitating tainted evidence on the basis of 
anything other than "demonstrated historical facts."128 For example, in 
United States v. Kennedy,129 the Sixth Circuit declined to adhere to an 
inflexible active pursuit requirement, holding that evidence would still 
be admissible if the prosecution could establish "other compelling 
facts" that establish inevitabilityP0 In this case, employees of 
Northwest Airlines at National Airport in Washington, D.C., encoun­
tered two unclaimed suitcases. Company policy was to open lost lug­
gage to look for identification. One case was opened with a Northwest 
key, revealing a huge sum of cash. The other had a combination lock, 
and the airline summoned the airport police. An officer unlawfully 
122. Id. at 208. 
123. Id. at 208. 
124. Id. at 208-09. 
125. Id. at 209. The Fourth Circuit noted that the government's "chain of inevitability" 
had too many "broken links." Id. at 210. 
126. Id. at 211. 
127. United States v. Brookins, 614 F.2d 1037, 1048 (5th Cir. 1980). 
128. See supra note 29 and accompanying text (discussing the Nix Court's requirement 
that the prosecution present "demonstrated historical facts capable of ready verification or 
impeachment" that discovery was inevitable, in order for the exception to apply). 
129. 61 F.3d 494 (6th Cir. 1995). 
130. Kennedy, 61 F.3d at 499-500 (concluding "that the inevitable discovery exception to 
the exclusionary rule applies when the government can demonstrate either the existence of 
an independent, untainted investigation that inevitably would have uncovered the same evi­
dence or other compelling facts establishing that the disputed evidence inevitably would 
have been discovered. Therefore, we hold that alternate, independent line of investigation is 
not required for the inevitable discovery exception to apply."). 
October 2000] Establishing Inevitability Without Active Pursuit 265 
opened the second case, which was determined to contain cocaine.131 
Although the police were not in active pursuit of an alternate line of 
investigation, the court found dispositive the fact that even had the 
police not conducted the illegal search, Northwest employees would 
have eventually opened the suitcase themselves in accordance with 
company policy. The discovery of the cocaine was therefore inevitable, 
regardless of the absence of active pursuit by law enforcement, and the 
evidence was admitted.132 
In sum, these cases demonstrate that inevitability may be legiti­
mately established in the absence of active pursuit, and that alternative 
standards, like the independent circumstances test, permit courts the 
necessary flexibility to perform an inquiry into the circumstances of 
widely varying cases. 
III. FOURTH AMENDMENT IMPLICATIONS 
The exclusionary rule functions to enforce fundamental Fourth 
Amendment rights, while exceptions, such as the inevitable discovery 
doctrine, by design block the operation of the exclusionary rule. Thus, 
it is imperative that rejecting the active pursuit doctrine does not result 
in the frequently expressed fear that the inevitable discovery exception 
may "swallow" or "emasculate" the protections guaranteed by the 
Fourth Amendment.133 This Part examines the Fourth Amendment 
implications of an inevitable discovery standard that does not include 
the active pursuit requirement. Section III.A argues that rejecting the 
active pursuit doctrine will not erode the exclusionary rule's deterrent 
effect on constitutional violations by law enforcement. Section III.B 
recognizes that limits must be imposed upon the use of the inevitable 
131. Id. at 496. Two members of the Metropolitan Washington Airport Authority Police 
responded to the call by Northwest Airlines. The officers were suspicious of the suitcase with 
the combination lock because it had a strong odor of perfume. Concerned that it might con­
tain explosives, the suitcase was x-rayed, which revealed a number of rectangular-shaped 
objects. One officer left the scene to make arrangements to transport the luggage to the air­
port police station, while the other officer remained behind. For reasons unexplained by the 
record, "[a]t that point, [a Northwest employee] decided to go ahead and open the black 
suitcase." She received permission from her supervisor, and asked the officer present to open 
it for her. The officer radioed his departed colleague, and asked if he could do so. The reply 
was that he "could open the suitcase if Northwest wanted it opened." The officer then pro­
ceeded to do so. Id. 
132. Id. at 500-01 ("[I]t is clear that, pursuant to Northwest's lost luggage policy, [a 
Northwest employee] would have opened the black suitcase and discovered the evidence in a 
private search had the airport police not become involved. Because a private search was in­
evitable, the cocaine is admissible pursuant to the inevitable discovery exception to the ex­
clusionary rule."). 
133. See, e.g. , United States v. Eng, 971 F.2d 854, 860 (2d Cir. 1992) (recognizing "the 
need to prevent the inevitable discovery exception from swallowing the exclusionary rule"); 
United States v. Cherry, 759 F.2d 1196, 1205 (5th Cir. 1985) (same); see also Lamberth, supra 
note 24, at 130 ("Application of inevitable discovery in the context of a fourth amendment 
violation would emasculate the warrant requirement . . . .  "). 
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discovery exception to admit evidence obtained without a warrant, but 
also argues that the active pursuit doctrine itself provides no addi­
tional protection of the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement. 
A. Deterring Police Misconduct 
According to the Nix Court, deterring law enforcement violations 
of constitutional rights is the "core rationale" for excluding illegally 
obtained evidence that is the "fruit of the poisonous tree."134 Although 
there is a "high social cost of letting persons obviously guilty go un­
punished for their crimes," probative evidence is suppressed so as to 
prevent the prosecution from exploiting to its benefit the illegal ac­
tions of the police.135 The Nix Court advanced what has been termed a 
"status quo ante" analysis of when the exclusionary rule applies.136 In 
other words, "the prosecution is not to be put in a better position than 
it would have been in if no illegality had transpired."137 But neither 
should the prosecution be "put in a worse position simply because of 
some earlier police error or misconduct."138 When the evidence would 
have inevitably been discovered - regardless of the constitutional 
134. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 442-43 (1984) ("The core rationale consistently ad­
vanced by this Court for extending the exclusionary rule to evidence that is the fruit of un­
lawful police conduct has been that this admittedly drastic and socially costly course is 
needed to deter police from violations of constitutional and statutory protections."). This 
point, like many of the issues surrounding the exclusionary rule, is contested, as the Court 
had in years prior indicated that the "imperative of judicial integrity" is a twin purpose of the 
exclusionary rule. See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960). But see, e.g., United 
States v. Brookins, 416 U.S. 1037, 1046-47 (1980) ("In the fourth amendment context, the 
'single and distinct' purpose for the exclusionary rule is deterrence of police violations") 
(citing Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 413 (1966)). 
The distinction is not merely esoteric, as many commentators assert that grounding the 
exclusionary rule upon a deterrence justification requires defending the doctrine's efficacy, 
rather than its constitutionality. See generally Kamisar, Exclusionary Rule, supra note 6. 
Consequently, proponents of the exclusionary rule assert that "the deterrence rationale 
seemed to provide the club with which [Chief Justice Burger] proposed to bludgeon the rule 
to death." Wasserstrom & Mertens, supra note 36, at 152. But this criticism in not universal, 
as another commentator has argued: 
[T]he deterrent view's lack of academic popularity has less to do with its inherent defects 
than with the Burger Court's having followed it while cutting back the scope of the rule. 
There is, however, no inevitable connection between the deterrent theory and a narrow 
scope for the exclusionary rule; the deterrent theory could equally well be invoked by a dif­
ferent Court to reach results far more protective of individual rights. 
Daniel J. Meltzer, Deterring Constitutional Violations by Law Enforcement Officials: Plain­
tiffs and Defendants As Private Attorneys General, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 247, 268-69 (1988). 
135. Nix, 467 U.S. at 443. 
136. See Leading Cases of the 1983 Term, supra note 22, at 122 ("The [Nix] majority jus­
tified its acceptance of the [inevitable discovery] exception by stating that the role of the ex­
clusionary rule is to restore the 'status quo ante' that would have existed in the absence of a 
constitutional violation."). 
137. Nix, 467 U.S. at 443. 
138. Id. at 443. 
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violation - the disincentive provided by exclusion is less necessary.139 
In these instances the evidence will be admitted; to hold otherwise 
"would reject logic, experience, and common sense."140 
Courts that adhere to the active pursuit doctrine posit that not re­
quiring an ongoing, independent investigation has the adverse effect of 
providing an incentive to the police to violate the Constitution, and 
permits courts to sanction this behavior. It has been argued that ap­
plying the inevitable discovery exception when the police have not 
been in active pursuit would actually encourage the officers to act un­
lawfully.141 Allegedly, without an ongoing, independent investigation, 
"(1) the police would usually be less certain that the discovery of the 
evidence is 'inevitable' in the absence of illegal conduct and (2) the 
danger that the evidence illegally obtained may be inadmissible would 
be reduced."142 This reasoning is unpersuasive, however, because it in­
accurately perceives the importance of the officers' awareness of 
whether the evidence would ultimately be discovered. 
Deterring police misconduct turns on the knowledge of the officer 
at the time of the constitutional violation.143 In other words, when an 
officer knows with absolute certainty that evidence may be obtained 
later by lawful means, there is an obvious incentive to go ahead and 
seize the evidence illegally, confident the evidence will be ultimately 
admissible under the inevitable discovery exception.144 In contrast, 
when the officer is unaware that the evidence may later be obtained 
lawfully, the incentives for an immediate illegal seizure are less clear.145 
139. See id. at 444 ("If the prosecution can establish by a preponderance of the evidence 
that the information ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means -
here the volunteers' search - then the deterrence rationale has so little basis that the evi­
dence should be received."). 
140. Id. at 444. 
141. E.g., United States v. Cherry, 759 F.2d 1196, 1204-05 (5th Cir. 1985) ("[W]hen the 
police have not been in active pursuit of an alternate line of investigation that is at a mini­
mum supportable by leads, the general application of the inevitable discovery exception 
would greatly encourage the police to engage in illegal conduct . . . .  "). 
142. Id. at 1204-05. 
143. "[T]he concept of effective deterrence assumes that the police officer consciously 
realizes the probable consequences of a presumably impermissible course of conduct. " Nix, 
467 U.S. at 445 (quoting United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 283 (1978)). 
144. See Wasserstrom & Mertens, supra note 36, at 167 ("[W]hen the officer knows that 
the evidence that he can acquire illegally now will otherwise be inevitably discovered later, 
then the exclusionary rule will no longer provide any disincentive to go after it now. The 
greater convenience of getting it now, rather than waiting, could well determine the officer's 
choice. "). 
145. Commentators generally conclude the police will go ahead and decide to break the 
law. See, e.g. , id. at 167("[I]f the officer does not know beforehand whether subsequent law­
ful measures are likely to lead to the evidence that he thinks he can acquire illegally now, 
then he could rationally conclude that he might as well try now.); Leading Cases of the 1983 
Term, supra note 22, at 125-26 ("One might just as easily believe that the [inevitable discov­
ery] exception's general effect . . .  will be to increase police officers' confidence that, even if 
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It may be argued that if it is later proven that discovery was inevitable, 
the officer's decision to proceed will have been vindicated.146 If discov­
ery is not found to have been inevitable, the evidence will be excluded, 
but the officer's decision was still rational because the evidence 
probably never would have been admissible at trial, and the prosecu­
tion is not disadvantaged.147 The problems with this analysis are two­
fold. First, it directly contradicts the Nix Court's assessment of the in­
centives provided by the inevitable discovery exception. Second, even 
assuming the Nix Court perceived the incentives incorrectly, the active 
pursuit doctrine itself does little to promote deterrence. 
The Nix Court addressed the deterrence of police misconduct in its 
rejection of the lower courts' holdings that the inevitable discovery ex­
ception applies only where the prosecution may prove the absence of 
bad faith by the investigating officers.148 In reversing Williams' second 
conviction, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals stated that "if there is 
to be an inevitable-discovery exception the State should not receive its 
benefit without proving that the police did not act in bad faith."149 The 
explicit justification for this requirement was that otherwise, "the 
temptation to risk deliberate violations of the Sixth Amendment 
would be too great, and the deterrent effect of the Exclusionary Rule 
reduced too far. "150 Although the Nix Court was discussing deterrence 
in the context of Sixth Amendment violations, its reasoning illustrates 
the Fourth Amendment as well. The Court stated that an officer con­
templating an illegal search "will rarely, if ever, be in a position to cal-
they violate fundamental rights to obtain evidence, prosecutors will be able to argue success­
fully for its admission."). 
146. See Wasserstrom & Mertens, supra note 36, at 167 ("If it turns out that discovery of 
the evidence was in any event inevitable, then nothing has been lost."). 
147. See id. 167 ("If, to the contrary, acquiring the evidence legally later seems to have 
been impossible, then the evidence will be suppressed. But again, nothing is lost because it 
likely never could have been obtained for use at trial anyway."). 
148. In affirming Williams's second conviction, the Iowa Supreme Court, recognizing for 
the first time the constitutional permissibility of the inevitable discovery exception, held that 
"[a]fter the defendant has shown unlawful conduct on the part of the police, the State has the 
burden to show by a preponderance of the evidence that . . .  the police did not act in bad 
faith for the purpose of hastening discovery of the evidence in question." State v. Williams, 
285 N.W.2d 248, 260 (Iowa 1979). The Iowa Supreme Court then found that "it cannot be 
said that the actions of the police were taken in bad faith." Id. at 261. In Williams's second 
petition for writ of habeas corpus, the federal district court stated that the inevitable discov­
ery test applied by the Iowa Supreme Court was "not constitutionally deficient," and denied 
relief. Williams v. Nix, 528 F. Supp. 664, 669 (S.D. Iowa 1981). The Court of Appeals for the 
Eighth Circuit, however, reversed the district court's judgment and set aside Williams's sec­
ond conviction, "hold[ing] that the State did not satisfy its burden of proving by a prepon­
derance of the evidence that the police did not act in bad faith in obtaining Williams's state­
ments that led them to the body." Williams v. Nix, 700 F.2d 1164, 1173 (8th Cir. 1983). For a 
detailed history of Williams's convictions, see supra Section I.A. 
149. Williams v. Nix, 700 F.2d at 1169 n.5. 
150. Nix, 467 U.S. at 445 (quoting Williams v. Nix, 700 F.2d at 1169 n.5). 
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culate whether the evidence sought would inevitably be discovered."151 
And when an officer does have knowledge of inevitable lawful discov­
ery, he will opt to wait and proceed legally because "there will be little 
to gain from taking any dubious 'shortcuts' to obtain the evidence."152 
Beyond the obvious potential that the evidence would then be inad­
missible at trial, the Court cites as additional disincentives the possi­
bility of departmental discipline and civil liability.153 Critics may posit 
that the inevitable discovery exception encourages law enforcement to 
act illegally, but the fact remains that the Nix Court explicitly consid­
ered the incentives created by the doctrine, and concluded that it 
would not promote police misconduct.154 
The alleged flaws in the Court's opinion in Nix, however, do not 
compel support for the active pursuit requirement. Assuming, for the 
sake of argument, that the Nix Court inaccurately calculated the incen-
151. Id. 
152. Id. at 446. 
153. Id. There is widespread skepticism that "alternative remedies" such as recovery in 
tort could effectively replace the exclusionary rule. See generally LAFAVE, supra note 2, § 
1.2( c ), at 34-38. On a related matter, it is interesting to note that at least two circuits have 
recently held that the inevitable discovery exception is not a bar to a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil 
suit by citizens against law enforcement for unlawful search and seizure. See DeBoer v. Pen­
nington, 206 F.3d 857, 865 (9th Cir. 2000); Chatman v. Slagle, 107 F.3d 380, 382-83 (6th Cir. 
1997) ("[T]he reasoning which supports the use of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule 
and the related inevitable discovery doctrine in criminal cases does not apply in civil rights 
actions. The Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule is in large part designed to deter uncon­
stitutional police behavior . . . .  A necessary part of this calculus is that there are other effec­
tive deterrents against police misbehavior which dwarf any incremental gain to be had from 
excluding evidence, most notably the possibility of civil liability. To hold that money dam­
ages are not available in such situations would turn Nix on its head and both eliminate an 
important disincentive to police misconduct and leave victims of unreasonable police action 
without any remedy."). 
154. Nix, 467 U.S. at 445-46 ("[W]hen an officer is aware that the evidence will inevita­
bly be discovered, he will try to avoid engaging in any questionable practice."). 
Cf Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 539-40 (1988) (internal citations omitted), 
which involved the independent source exception, and featured a similar debate over the 
incentives created by exceptions to the exclusionary rule for law enforcement to act unlaw­
fully: 
Petitioners' asserted policy basis for excluding evidence which is initially discovered during 
an illegal search, but is subsequently acquired through an independent and lawful source, is 
that a contrary rule will remove all deterrence to, and indeed positively encourage, unlawful 
police searches. As petitioners see the incentives, Jaw enforcement officers will routinely en­
ter without a warrant to make sure that what they expect to be on the premises is in fact 
there. If it is not, they will have spared themselves the time and trouble of getting a warrant; 
if it is, they can get the warrant and use the evidence despite the unlawful entry. We see the 
incentives differently. An officer with probable cause sufficient to obtain a search warrant 
would be foolish to enter the premises first in an unlawful manner. By doing so, he would 
risk suppression of all evidence on the premises, both seen and unseen, since his action 
would add to the normal burden of convincing a magistrate that there is probable cause the 
much more onerous burden of convincing a trial court that no information gained from the 
illegal entry affected either the Jaw enforcement officers' decision to seek a warrant or the 
magistrate's decision to grant it. Nor would the officer without sufficient probable cause to 
obtain a search warrant have any added incentive to conduct an unlawful entry, since what­
ever he finds cannot be used to establish probable cause before a magistrate. 
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tives officers are faced with - i.e., that the police have "nothing to 
lose" by searching illegally now and claiming lawful inevitable discov­
ery later155 - requiring the presence of an ongoing, independent inves­
tigation does little to remedy the problem. The reason that the active 
pursuit doctrine, in its present form, itself provides only negligible ad­
ditional safeguarding of Fourth Amendment rights. To advance effec­
tively the deterrence goals of the exclusionary rule, any active pursuit 
standard would have to require that the officer contemplating whether 
to proceed unconstitutionally be unaware of the presence of the alter­
nate investigation. Otherwise, logic indicates that an officer may con­
sciously rely on the active pursuit of his colleagues and proceed with 
an illegal search, confident that the ongoing investigation prong of the 
inevitable discovery exception is satisfied, and ensuring the admissi­
bility of the evidence. There are multiple doctrinal and practical 
problems with any such lack-of-knowledge requirement that would 
mandate the offending officer be unaware of the lawful active pursuit 
of fellow law enforcement agents. 
First, and most importantly, a lack-of-knowledge requirement is di­
rectly contradicted by the facts in Nix.156 Detective Learning's aware­
ness of the ongoing, alternate investigation of his fellow officers was 
obviously demonstrated by his command to Agent Ruxlow to cease 
with the search after Williams agreed to lead the police to Powers' 
body.157 Second, a lack-of-knowledge requirement that focuses on an 
officer's subjective intent is too closely akin to the absence of bad faith 
requirement rejected by the Nix Court as "formalistic, pointless, and 
punitive."158 The inevitable discovery exception, it must be remem­
bered, "involves no speculative elements," and requires the prosecu­
tion to present "demonstrated historical facts" that establish by a pre­
ponderance of the evidence the legal means the prosecution would 
have employed to ultimately discover the evidence.159 Whether the 
155. See, e.g., Bloom, supra note 28, at 95 ("The [Nix] Court naively felt that a police 
officer who is about to obtain evidence in an illegal manner would not be able to calculate 
whether the evidence would have inevitably been discovered."); Leading Cases of the 1983 
Term, supra note 22, at 126 ("[T]he [Nix] Court's assertion that the [inevitable discovery] 
exception will induce additional caution on the part of police ignores the incentives that the 
exception creates: obtaining evidence illegally, rather than waiting for its 'inevitable' discov­
ery in due course, would eliminate any uncertainty that the evidence actually might not be 
obtained and would obviate the need for police to devote further resources to the search."). 
156. See generally supra Section I.A. 
157. Nix, 467 U.S. at 449. 
158. ld. at 445. 
159. ld. at 444 n.5. Cf id. at 457 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("Even if Detective Leaming 
acted in bad faith in the sense that he deliberately violated the Constitution in order to avoid 
the possibility that the body would not be discovered, the prosecution ultimately does not 
avoid that risk; its burden of proof forces it to assume the risk. The need to adduce proof 
sufficient to discharge its burden, and the difficulty in predicting whether such proof will be 
available or sufficient, means that the inevitable discovery rule does not permit state officials 
to avoid the uncertainty they would have faced but for the constitutional violation."). 
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searching officer was unaware of the active pursuit of his colleagues in 
no way aids the statecin demonstrating the presence of lawful measures 
that would have led to inevitable discovery.160 
Finally, a lack-of-knowledge requirement would vastly alter the 
scope of the active pursuit doctrine as presently applied. Not only do 
courts that adhere to the active pursuit doctrine not require unaware­
ness by the offending officer of the independent actions by other offi­
cers, they do not even mandate that the alternate investigation have 
been undertaken by an additional, separate officer. For example, the 
Eighth Circuit in United States v. Hammons161 recently found active 
pursuit where a highway patrol officer during a traffic stop obtained 
involuntary consent to conduct a search that revealed narcotics. Be­
cause the officer told the defendant before the impermissible search 
that if he refused to consent, a drug-sniffing canine would be called, 
the court found that "[t]he officer's assertion that he would call a drug 
dog indicates that the officer had initiated an alternative plan at the 
time of the constitutional violation."162 The fact that the mere assertion 
that lawful means were available may suffice to establish an independ­
ent line of investigation demonstrates that the active pursuit require­
ment, by itself, does little to deter police misconduct.163 To the con­
trary, the doctrine may actually erode the deterrence goals of the 
exclusionary rule by creating an incentive for officers, aware that the 
actions of themselves or others likely constitute active pursuit, to go 
ahead and circumvent the Fourth Amendment. 
160. Cf. Cohn, supra note 24, at 749 ("The [Nix] Court was correct to dismiss the Court 
of Appeals 'bad faith' requirement . .. because this requirement rejects the logic on which 
the inevitable discovery rule is based. Proof of inevitable discovery severs any causal connec­
tion between the misconduct and the discovery of the challenged evidence. It therefore 
makes no sense to invoke a good or a bad faith test because the mens rea of the offending 
officer is irrelevant to the question of causation. When no causal connection exists between 
the police illegality and the evidence in question, the bad faith of the offending officer will 
not provide one."). 
161. 152 F.3d 1025 (8th Cir. 1998). 
162. Id. at 1030 ("In short, the only event that stopped the officer from calling the drug­
canine unit before the officer opened the envelope was the defendant's consent. Similarly, 
the only event that stopped the Nix search team from resuming its search was the defen­
dant's coerced agreement to lead the police to the body. We therefore find that a substantial, 
alternative line of investigation was underway which would have led to the inevitable discov­
ery of the cocaine absent the police misconduct. "). 
163. Note, however, that the Eighth Circuit's language in Hammons seems to contradict 
directly the words one of its sister circuits that also requires active pursuit. Again, the Eighth 
Circuit stated that "[t]he officer's assertion that he would call a drug dog indicates that the 
officer had initiated an alternative plan at the time of the constitutional violation." 
Hammons, 152 F.3d at 1030. Contrast this statement with the language of the Fifth Circuit: 
"The mere assertion of inevitable discovery must fail ... the police must show that when the 
illegality occurred they possessed and were actively pursuing the evidence or leads that 
would have led to the discovery of the challenged [evidence]." United States v. Brookins, 614 
F.2d 1037, 1048 (5th Cir. 1980). 
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Except in certain narrow circumstances, law enforcement officials 
may not decide independently to initiate a lawful search or seizure; the 
Fourth Amendment requires that police obtain advance judicial ap­
proval in the form of a warrant.164 Because Nix involved a violation of 
the Sixth Amendment, the Court neglected to discuss explicitly the 
impact of the inevitable discovery exception on the Fourth Amend­
ment warrant requirement.165 Nevertheless, the inevitable discovery 
exception applies also to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, 
and the active pursuit doctrine therefore necessarily implicates the 
warrant requirement.166 A proper formulation of the inevitable discov­
ery exception is thus vital to guard against the elimination of funda­
mental Fourth Amendment guarantees.167 This Section demonstrates, 
however, that in light of the Supreme Court's post-Nix decision in 
Murray v. United States,168 as well as the practice of courts that adhere 
to the independent circumstances test, the active pursuit requirement 
is unnecessary as an additional safeguard to the warrant requirement. 
164. E.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) ("[T]he Constitution requires 
'that the deliberate, impartial judgment of a judicial officer . . .  be imposed between the citi­
zen and the police' . . .  and that searches conducted outside the judicial process, without 
prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amend­
ment - subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions." (in­
ternal citations omitted)); see also United States v. Cardona-Rivera, 904 F.2d 1149, 1155 (7th 
Cir. 1990) (noting the "modem rule that a warrant is a condition precedent to a lawful search 
or seizure, other than in exceptional circumstances of which superfluity is not one"). But see 
California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 582 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("Even before today's 
decision, the [Fourth Amendment] 'warrant requirement' had become so riddled with excep­
tions that it was basically unrecognizable."). 
165. Bloom, supra note 28, at 95 ("Because the Nix decision dealt with a Sixth Amend­
ment violation, the Court probably was not focusing on the effect [the inevitable discovery] 
exception would have on the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement."); Leading Cases of 
the 1983 Term, supra note 22, at 126 ("[T]he [Nix] Court ignores entirely a disturbing possi­
bility - that a broad application of the [inevitable discovery] exception's logic might be em­
ployed to gut the warrant requirement of the fourth amendment by permitting the introduc­
tion of evidence obtained without a warrant on the theory that police 'inevitably' would have 
obtained one."). 
166. Bloom, supra note 28, at 98 ("The alternative investigation required of the police to 
qualify for the inevitable discovery exception also has an effect on the warrant require­
ment."). 
167. See United States v. Allen, 159 F.3d 832, 841 (4th Cir. 1998) ("The existence of 
probable cause for a warrant, in and of itself and without any evidence that the police would 
have acted to obtain a warrant, does not trigger the inevitable discovery doctrine any more 
than probable cause, in and of itself, renders a warrantless search valid. The inevitable dis­
covery doctrine applies to alleviate 'formalistic' and 'pointless' applications of the exclusion­
ary rule, but it does not and cannot eliminate Fourth Amendment protections.") (internal 
citation omitted); see also LAFAVE, supra note 2, § 11.4(a) at 244 ("If the [inevitable discov­
ery] doctrine were applied when such a [constitutional] shortcut was intentionally taken, the 
effect would be to read out of the Fourth Amendment the requirement that other, more 
elaborate and protective procedures be followed. This is particularly apparent when the 
shortcut was a bypassing of the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement . . . .  "). 
168. 487 U.S. 533 (1988). 
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1. Warrantless Searches Followed by a Warrant 
At the outset, a distinction must be made between warrantless 
searches in which a warrant is later sought and issued, and those in 
which one is not.169 In the first situation, where the police obtain a war­
rant after committing the constitutional violation, the foremost con­
cern is that information about criminal activity derived from the illegal 
search will be included in the affidavit presented to a magistrate, 
thereby ensuring judicial approval.170 If the police were not in active 
pursuit of an alternate, lawful line of investigation at the time of the 
constitutional violation, the probability increases that facts essential to 
the probable cause determination were derived from the illegal search. 
The First Circuit, in United States v. Silvestri,111 recognized that, admit­
ting the evidence in these circumstances potentially could compromise 
the integrity of the warrant requirement, but nonetheless it rejected 
the active pursuit doctrine. The Silvestri court analyzed the inevitable 
discovery exception as implicating the independence and inevitability 
of the warrant.172 To determine whether the warrant was inevitable, 
the fact that a warrant was actually issued is partially dispositive; but 
an active pursuit requirement may be useful to determine that the 
warrant was not issued solely in reliance on evidence found during the 
illegal search.173 To protect the independence of the warrant, however, 
the First Circuit found that the active pursuit doctrine was a "bright­
line rule" that "goes too far."174 The court stated that often the delay 
between the unlawful search and the initiation of the warrant will be 
due to "various practical problems entirely unrelated to a decision to 
seek a warrant."175 The First Circuit therefore rejected the "inflexible" 
169. See United States v. Silvestri, 787 F.2d 736, 744-46 (1st Cir. 1986) (discussing the 
distinction between the two possible situations). 
170. See, e.g., United States v. Satterfield, 743 F.2d 827, 846-47 (11th Cir. 1984) ("Be­
cause a valid search warrant nearly always can be obtained after the search has occurred, a 
contrary holding would practically destroy the requirement that a warrant for the search of a 
home be obtained before the search takes place."). 
171. 787 F.2d 736 (1st Cir. 1986). 
172. Id. at 744. The First Circuit also discussed whether active pursuit was: 
necessary to remove what would otherwise be an incentive to police to take a chance that the 
inevitable discovery exception might save the evidence in a situation where the discovery of 
the evidence seemed doubtful. We do not find, however, that the use of this requirement 
achieves this purpose. If the demands that the legal means of obtaining the evidence be both 
inevitable and independent are strictly enforced, post hoc suggestions of alternate legal 
means will not be accepted as a basis for the inevitable discovery exception. 
Id. at 745-46. 
173. Id. at 745 ("[T]he requirement of active pursuit could be viewed as ensuring the 
independent inevitability of the police decision to seek the search warrant, i.e., to ensure that 
the evidence turned up in the illegal search did not influence this decision."). 
174. Id. 
175. Id. 
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active pursuit requirement as ill-suited to handle the multiple fact pat­
terns that arise in these situations in favor of a requirement that the 
police have probable cause prior to the unlawful search, and an analy­
sis that focuses on the independence and inevitability of the eventual 
issuance of the warrant.176 
The First Circuit's conclusion that active pursuit is not required 
when a warrantless search is followed by the issuance of a warrant is 
bolstered by the Supreme Court's 1988 opinion in Murray.177 Although 
this decision involved the independent source doctrine, the Court ex­
plicitly noted that "[t]he inevitable discovery doctrine, with its distinct 
requirements, is in reality an extrapolation from the independent 
source doctrine."178 In Murray, the police illegally entered a ware­
house, observed in plain view bales of marijuana, left without disturb­
ing the evidence, and did not reenter until after they had obtained a 
valid search warrant.179 The Court ruled that evidence is admissible, 
although first discovered unlawfully, if subsequently "rediscovered" by 
legal means independent from the initial illegality.180 To arrive at this 
conclusion, the Murray Court applied to the independent source the 
same "status quo ante" analysis developed by the Nix Court in recog­
nizing the inevitable discovery exception.181 Dissenting in Murray, 
Justice Marshall repeated the argument he had made three terms ear­
lier in Nix by asserting that the independent source doctrine (like the 
inevitable discovery exception) should not be applied unless the police 
demonstrated active pursuit by having already sought the warrant 
prior to the initiation of the illegal search.182 Justice Scalia, writing for 
the majority, flatly rejected this admonition to "adopt a per se rule of 
inadmissibility" in the absence of active pursuit, instead deferring to 
176. Id. at 746. 
177. Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533 (1988). See Bloom, supra note 28, at 96-97 
("Although the Supreme Court has not dealt directly with the impact that inevitable discov­
ery might have on the warrant requirement, there is at least some indication by the Court 
that this factor is not viewed as a problem. Murray has been used to support the proposition 
that inevitable discovery can be used even where it would sanction warrantless activity. The 
facts of Murray indicate that tltere was an illegal warrantless search performed prior to the 
obtaining of a lawful warrant."). 
178. Murray, 487 U.S. at 539. 
179. Id. at 535-36. 
180. Id. at 542. 
181. The Court stated: 
Knowledge that the marijuana was in the warehouse was assuredly acquired at the time of 
the unlawful entry. But it was also acquired at the time of entry pursuant to the warrant, and 
if that later acquisition was not the result of the earlier entry there is no reason why the in­
dependent source doctrine should not apply. Invoking the exclusionary rule would put the 
police (and society) not in the same position they would have occupied if no violation oc­
curred, but in a worse one. 
Id. at 541 (citing Nix v. Williams 467 U.S. 431, 443 (1984)). 
182. Id. at 549 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
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courts the necessary discretion to adjudge independence on the basis 
of the facts they are presented.183 In light of the multiple similarities 
between the two doctrines, Murray's ruling that active pursuit is not 
required for the independent source exception to apply when a war­
rantless search is followed by the issuance of a valid warrant should be 
understood to extend to the application of the inevitable discovery ex­
ception in similar circumstances.184 If a search requires a warrant, and 
one is later obtained, the active pursuit doctrine is unnecessary as an 
additional safeguard to the integrity of the Fourth Amendment war­
rant requirement. 
2. Warrantless Searches not Followed by a Warrant 
In the second situation - a warrantless search after which no war" 
rant is ultimately obtained - the active pursuit requirement provides 
no additional protection of the Fourth Amendment warrant require­
ment. Courts that reject the active pursuit doctrine consistently adhere 
to a simple yet stringent standard: "when evidence could not have 
been discovered without a subsequent search, and no exception to the 
warrant requirement applies, and no warrant has been obtained, and 
nothing demonstrates that the police would have obtained a warrant 
absent the illegal search, the inevitable discovery doctrine has no 
place."185 Refusing to apply the inevitable discovery exception in these 
183. Id. at 540 n.2 ("Justice Marshall argues, in effect, that where the police cannot point 
to some historically verifiable fact demonstrating that the subsequent search pursuant to a 
warrant was wholly unaffected by the prior illegal search - e.g., that they had already sought 
the warrant before entering the premises - we should adopt a per se rule of inadmissibility. 
We do not believe that such a prophylactic exception to the independent source rule is nec­
essary. To say that a district court must be satisfied that a warrant would have been sought 
without the illegal entry is not to give dispositive effect to police officers' assurances on the 
point. Where the facts render those assurances implausible, the independent source doctrine 
will not apply." (internal citations omitted)). 
184. Although no court has yet adopted (or repudiated) this reasoning, the government 
has argued it. See United States v. Lamas, 930 F.2d 1099, 1103-04 (5th Cir. 1991) ("The gov­
ernment argues . . .  that a footnote in the Supreme Court's decision in Murray undermines 
the rationale . . . for continuing to impose the active-pursuit requirement . . . . Neither 
Murray nor any of our cases, however, disputes that a showing of active pursuit of an alter­
nate line of investigation together with a showing of reasonable probability of discovery . . .  
is sufficient to sustain the application of the inevitable-discovery exception. Whether this ac­
tive-pursuit element . . .  is still necessary to implicate the inevitable-discovery rule must await 
the case that turns on that question." (internal citations omitted)). 
185. United States v. Allen, 159 F.3d 832, 841 (4th Cir. 1998) (emphasis added); see also 
United States v. Chanthavong, No. 98-4244, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 21554, at *25 (4th Cir. 
Sept. 8, 1999) ("The inevitable discovery doctrine does not apply where the police officers 
had probable cause to conduct a search but simply failed to obtain a warrant."); United 
States v. Mejia, 69 F.3d 309, 320 (9th Cir. 1995) ("This court has never applied the inevitable 
discovery exception so as to excuse the failure to obtain a search warrant where the police 
had probable cause but simply did not attempt to obtain a warrant."); United States v. John­
son, 22 F.3d 674, 683 (6th Cir. 1994) ("[T]o hold that simply because the police could have 
obtained a warrant, it was therefore inevitable that they would have done so would mean 
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instances undoubtedly is correct, as a contrary rule would nullify the 
essential function of a magistrate to stand between the police and the 
target of their investigation.186 The police, whenever confident that 
they possessed sufficient probable cause, would have no incentive to 
obtain advance judicial consent to search, effectively reading the war­
rant requirement out of the Constitution.187 In the words of Judge 
Richard Posner, "[t]o excuse getting a warrant on such grounds would 
be like saying that lynching a man is okay provided you have a well­
grounded belief that if tried he would have been convicted and sen­
tenced to death and the sentence carried out."188 
Courts' inconsistent notions of what constitutes active pursuit189 se­
verely undermine the doctrine's utility, and demonstrate that the doc­
trine provides no additional protection of the Fourth Amendment 
warrant requirement where unlawful searches are not followed by the 
issuance of a warrant. For example, consider the following two similar, 
but not identical, factual scenarios. Assume law enforcement officials 
engaged in a warrantless entry into a suspect's residence, performed a 
protective sweep, and observed incriminating evidence in plain view. 
In case A ,  prior to initiation of the search, government agents had al­
ready arrived at the U.S. Attorney's office and commenced work on a 
search warrant affidavit. When informed of the unlawful entry, and 
that the suspect had consented to a further search, the agents ceased 
preparing the application, and a warrant was never issued. In case B, 
after the warrantless entry had already occurred, one of the partici­
pating officers began walking outside to his car to depart the premises 
and begin preparing an affidavit. Only moments later, before even get­
ting into his vehicle, the officer was likewise informed that the suspect 
that there is inevitable discovery and no warrant requirement whenever there is probable 
cause."). 
186. See United States v. Salgado, 807 F.2d 603, 608-09 (7th Cir. 1986) ("We do not sug­
gest that in cases where a warrant is necessary for a lawful search, the government can use 
evidence seized without a warrant if it can show that it would have gotten a warrant if it had 
asked for one. That would defeat the purpose of requiring a warrant, which is to interpose a 
neutral judicial officer between the police and its quarry . . . .  "). 
187. See Allen, 159 F.3d at 842 ("The inevitable discovery doctrine cannot rescue evi­
dence obtained via an unlawful search simply because probable cause existed to obtain a 
warrant when the government presents no evidence that the police would have obtained a 
warrant. Any other rule would emasculate the Fourth Amendment."); Mejia, 69 F.3d at 320 
("If evidence were admitted notwithstanding the officers' unexcused failure to obtain a war­
rant, simply because probable cause existed, then there would never be any reason for offi­
cers to seek a warrant. To apply the inevitable discovery doctrine whenever the police could 
have obtained a warrant but chose not to would in effect eliminate the warrant require­
ment."). 
188. Salgado, 807 F.2d at 609. 
189. Indeed, even in Nix, where every member of the Court apparently found active 
pursuit in the facts of that case, their interpretation is not immune from challenge. See supra 
notes 67-68. 
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consented to a full search, and the police abandoned any further effort 
to obtain a warrant. 
Although the substantial steps taken by the agents in case A 
seemingly exhibited strong proof of active pursuit, the Second Circuit 
held otherwise, and refused to apply the inevitable discovery excep­
tion.190 The court reasoned that if establishing inevitability rested on a 
showing that a warrant would have been ultimately issued, it was cru­
cial to determine how close the police were to obtaining a magistrate's 
approval when they became aware of the illegal search and abandoned 
their efforts.191 If even a "residual possibility" existed that the govern­
ment had insufficient probable cause to persuade a magistrate, as­
suming a warrant was forthcoming would be too speculative, and any 
incriminating evidence must be suppressed.192 The Fifth Circuit, on the 
other hand, found that the relatively minor actions of an officer in a 
series of events similar to those in hypothetical case B sufficed to es­
tablish active pursuit, and thus the inevitable discovery exception al­
lowed for the admission of the challenged evidence.193 The court stated 
that its precedents "did not mechanically particularize the steps pre­
requisite to the application of the inevitable discovery rule," and that 
no "line of inevitability" could not be drawn at the point of preparing 
the affidavit or contacting the magistrate; the evidence was therefore 
admissible under the inevitable discovery exception.194 The fact that 
the mere initiation of the warrant application process may (or may 
not) constitute an ongoing, independent investigation indicates that 
the active pursuit doctrine does not, by itself, adequately safeguard the 
warrant requirement. The active pursuit doctrine, therefore, provides 
no greater Fourth Amendment protection beyond what is already af­
forded by courts that adhere to the general standard that the inevita­
ble discovery exception may not be invoked when a warrantless search 
is not followed by the issuance of a valid warrant. 
190. United States v. Cabassa, 62 F.3d 470 (2d Cir. 1995). 
191. Id. at 473 ("In cases in which a claim of inevitable discovery is based on expected 
issuance of a warrant, the extent to which the warrant process has been completed at the 
time those seeking the warrant learn of the search is of great importance."). 
192. Id. at 474 ("At best, the government's showing in the instant matter would support 
separate findings that more probably than not a warrant would eventually have issued and 
that more probably than not the evidence would have been in the apartment when a lawful 
search occurred. Either of these findings is susceptible to factual error - the magistrate 
judge might not be satisfied as to the showing of probable cause or, more likely, the evidence 
might disappear before issuance or execution of a warrant, or both - and the combined 
chance of error undermines the conclusion that discovery of the evidence pursuant to a law­
ful search was inevitable."). 
193. United States v. Lamas, 930 F.2d 1099 (5th Cir. 1991). 
194. Id. at 1103 ("It is not uncommon for officers to contend that if not for some inter­
vening event - such as a confession or a consent to search - they would have gotten a valid 
search warrant and would have discovered the evidence legally in the absence of the illegal 
search."). 
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CONCLUSION 
The inevitable discovery doctrine remains a controversial yet es­
tablished exception to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule. As 
noted by the foremost scholar on search and seizure law: "The con­
cerns expressed by opponents of the 'inevitable discovery' rule are le­
gitimate and ought not be dismissed out of hand. A careful assessment 
of their arguments, however, indicates that they are directed not so 
much to the rule itself as to its application in a loose and unthinking 
fashion."195 The active pursuit requirement, however, is not a neces­
sary mechanism to ensure the proper application of the inevitable dis­
covery exception, and it should be duly rejected. 
The active pursuit doctrine is an unsupported extension of the Su­
preme Court's holding in Nix. It operates as a formalistic "bright-line" 
rule ill-equipped to address the multiple fact patterns that implicate 
the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule. Further, there exists an al­
ternative standard - the independent circumstances test - that ade­
quately establishes inevitability in the absence of active pursuit. Fi­
nally, rejecting the active pursuit doctrine will not erode the 
deterrence goals of the exclusionary rule, nor will it compromise the 
integrity of the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement. 
195. LAFAVE, supra note 2, § ll.4(a), at 243-44. 
